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THE LEGACY OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT’S APPROACH TO  
GOVERNMENTAL POWERS 
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ABSTRACT 
 
This Article explores how Theodore Roosevelt viewed the structure of 
government within the United States in the late 1800s and early 1900s.  It 
particularly considers his standpoints on the interrelationships between the 
three branches of government—executive, legislative, and judicial—at both 
the federal and state levels.  More specifically, it investigates Roosevelt’s 
perspectives on presidential use of executive orders to take action in the 
face of Congressional inertia in the federal government.  Considering state 
governments, it examines his views in favor of restricting the independence 
of the judiciary.  The Article suggests that, while Theodore Roosevelt’s 
approach to the judiciary has not been followed, he helped set the stage for 
the active use of executive orders in shaping the federal laws, which has 
substantially influenced the relationship between the president and 
Congress.  Whether or not one agrees with presidential use of executive 
orders to effectuate major legal and policy changes, Roosevelt’s legacy in 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
This Article arose out of a symposium on President Roosevelt, hosted 
by the Theodore Roosevelt Center at Dickinson State University, at which I 
was invited to speak.1  Therefore, it may read more like an oral presentation 
for a largely non-legal audience than a traditional law review article.  Every 
year, the Theodore Roosevelt Center in western North Dakota hosts a 
symposium exploring various issues related to our former president.2  One 
 
1.  I would like to give a special thanks to Anne Mostad-Jensen, one of our outstanding law 
librarians at the University of North Dakota School of Law, for her expert research in helping me 
prepare for this presentation.  My Burtness Scholar Research Assistants, Calley Campbell and 
Thaddeus Swanson, provided additional invaluable support in conducting research for the 
presentation and this Article. 
2.  See Events, THEODORE ROOSEVELT CTR., http://www.theodorerooseveltcenter.org/en 
/Get-Involved/Events.aspx (last visited Feb. 16, 2017).  Each year, the Theodore Roosevelt Center 
hosts a symposium exploring various issues related to our former president, such as the one in the 
fall of 2016 addressing Theodore Roosevelt and the 1912 election.  Moreover, Dickinson State 
University has been selected to house the nation’s Theodore Roosevelt Presidential Library, 
containing a museum as well as public access to both digital and print libraries.  Currently only 
thirteen presidential libraries exist across the United States, so the Theodore Roosevelt 
Presidential Library would be the fourteenth, which will be a wonderful centerpiece for North 
Dakota.  Board approves system budget request, N.D. UNIV. SYS. (Jun. 28, 2016), 
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might ask, why is the center located in North Dakota?  Why was it not 
established in New York, where Roosevelt was born, became New York 
City Police Commissioner, served in the New York Legislative Assembly, 
was elected as Governor of the state, and is buried?  In response to these 
questions, it is important to recall that as a relatively young man, Theodore 
Roosevelt spent several years (cumulatively) living in the Badlands region 
of the western part of North Dakota, in part while he was recovering from 
the death of his wife and mother—both on the same day—on February 14, 
1884.3  He subsequently attributed his tremendous success in politics—and 
particularly his ascendency to the presidency—to the time that he spent in 
North Dakota, saying “I never would have been President if it had not been 
for my experiences in North Dakota.”4  We North Dakotans are very proud 
of this fact and have claimed Theodore Roosevelt as one of our own.  
Therefore, the Theodore Roosevelt Center was founded in North Dakota 
and holds an annual conference commemorating the president’s 
contributions to our region and our nation.5 
In September 2015, the symposium focused on “Theodore Roosevelt 
and the Law.”6  Clay Jenkinson, the director of the Center, asked me to give 
a presentation delving into issues relating to Theodore Roosevelt and the 
U.S. Constitution, particularly investigating his perspectives on presidential 




3.  Julie A. Oseid, The Power of Zeal: Teddy Roosevelt’s Life and Writing, 10 LEGAL COMM. 
& RHETORIC: JALWD 125, 131 (2013). 
4.  Theodore Roosevelt National Park, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://www.nps.gov/nr/travel/ 
presidents/t_roosevelt_park.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2017). 
5.  I was delighted to participate in this event, as I had heard about the symposium for years 
but had not had an opportunity previously to attend.  I learned a great deal about other aspects of 
Roosevelt’s life and influence on the law from the other speakers.  For example, Professor Kermit 
Roosevelt, III provided a fascinating keynote speech addressing additional aspects regarding 
Theodore Roosevelt and the Constitution.  I would encourage anyone who is interested in this era 
of our nation’s history to attend the symposium in the future.  The theme for the symposium in 
September/October 2016 was Theodore Roosevelt: Candidate in the Arena.  Symposia, 
THEODORE ROOSEVELT CTR., http://www.theodorerooseveltcenter.org/en/Get-Involved/Events/ 
Archive/Symposia.aspx (last visited Feb. 16, 2017). 
6.  Id. 
7.  I would like to extend my heartfelt thanks to Clay Jenkinson for the opportunity to give 
this presentation and subsequently to publish an expanded version of my remarks as this Article.  
Many of the concepts developed in this Article arose from the dialogue that I had with Mr. 
Jenkinson during the question and answer segment of my presentation at the symposium, for 
which I am very grateful to him.  I also want to thank Shannon Patterson for her kind introduction 
to my presentation.  Shannon was a senior at Dickinson State University majoring in psychology 
and minoring in leadership studies.  She was in her fourth year as a Theodore Roosevelt Scholar 
and her second year as Vice President of the Theodore Roosevelt Honors Program’s Executive 
Committee. 
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Article arises out of that presentation and explores how Roosevelt viewed 
the structure of government in the United States (“U.S.”) during the late 
1800s and early 1900s.  In particular, this Article examines how he 
perceived the checks and balances among the executive, legislative, and 
judicial branches of government.  It explores Roosevelt’s use of executive 
orders to create sweeping policy changes when he felt that Congress was 
neglecting its duties to address issues of national significance.  
Furthermore, it delves into his attacks on judicial independence, such as 
when he deemed that the courts were erecting reactionary roadblocks to 
progressive legislation.  Roosevelt’s aspirations regarding the courts 
thankfully largely failed.  However, he has left an enduring legacy 
regarding presidential use of executive orders that remains to this day.  
Whether or not one agrees with presidential use of executive orders to 
effectuate major legal and policy changes, Roosevelt’s legacy in originating 
the extensive use of this practice remains significant today. 
II. ROOSEVELT’S EXPANSION OF EXECUTIVE ORDERS 
A central aspect of Theodore Roosevelt’s approach to governmental 
powers that has continuing repercussions is the use of executive authority in 
the face of Congressional inaction, and particularly his unprecedented and 
extensive use of executive orders.8  An executive order is a directive issued 
by a president requiring an agency or official within the executive branch of 
the federal government to take certain actions.9  Roosevelt was the first 
president significantly to expand the use of executive orders and other 
actions as mechanisms enabling the federal government to take action on 
 
8.  THEODORE ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 420 (1985 ed. 
1913) (while discussing “[t]he idea that the Executive is the steward of public welfare,” Roosevelt 
indicated that “[t[he laws were often insufficient, and it became well nigh impossible to get them 
amended in the public interest when once the representatives of privilege in Congress grasped the 
fact that I would sign no amendment that contained anything not in the public interest.  It was 
necessary to use what law was already in existence, and then further to supplement it by Executive 
action.”). 
9.  William D. Neighbors, Comment, Presidential Legislation by Executive Order, 37 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 105, 106 (1964). 
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important issues.10  He issued an average of over 140 executive orders per 
year, and by the end of his term in office had delivered 1081.11 
A. HISTORICAL USE OF EXECUTIVE ORDERS 
Of course, executive orders have been used by nearly all Presidents 
throughout the course of our nation’s history, including by Presidents who 
helped establish the country and its government.  For example, the very first 
President, George Washington, issued eight of them.12  James Madison also 
issued one during his term as the fourth president of the United States.13  
Because Washington and Madison both signed the U.S. Constitution, they 
were very familiar with the limitations that the U.S. Constitution placed on 
the presidency.  Presumably they felt that the U.S. Constitution did not 
forbid them from taking this action while they served as President, even 
though they used executive orders very sparingly.  John Adams, who served 
as the second President, issued one, and Thomas Jefferson, the third 
President, issued four.14  One of Jefferson’s actions that was not initially 
termed an executive order but has been deemed so subsequently is the 
Louisiana Purchase in 1803.15  This action vastly expanded the territory of 
the nation, and it was only after the fact that Congress authorized the funds 
for the purchase. 
Although Presidents have issued executive orders since the very 
founding of our country, their use was not extensive early on in our 
country’s history.  Presidents issued fewer than twenty executive orders 
throughout their terms in office up until the 1850s.16  William Henry 
Harrison, the ninth President, is the only one who did not issue an executive 
order.17  However, Harrison died of complications from pneumonia on his 
thirty-second day in office, serving the shortest tenure in United States 
 
10.  ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 8, at 479 
(Stating that “occasionally great national crises arise which call for immediate and vigorous 
executive action, and . . . in such cases it is the duty of the President to act upon the theory that he 
is the steward of the people, and that the proper attitude for him to take is that he is bound to 
assume that he has the legal right to do whatever the needs of the people demand, unless the 
Constitution or the laws explicitly forbid him to do it.”). 
11.  Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley, Executive Orders, THE AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT 
(John T. Woolley & Gerhard Peters, eds., Jan. 20, 2017), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ 
data/orders.php. 
12.  Id. 
13.  Id. 
14.  Id. 
15.  Tara L. Branum, President or King? The Use and Abuse of Executive Orders in Modern-
Day America, 28 J. LEGIS. 1, 37 (2002); see generally Neighbors, supra note 9, at 106 (“Jefferson 
purchased the Louisiana Territory from France without any prior authority from Congress.”). 
16.  Peters & Woolley, supra note 11. 
17.  Id. 
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presidential history, from March 4 through April 4, 1841; therefore, he did 
not have much time to do anything while in office. 
Presidential use of executive orders gradually became more popular in 
the latter part of the 1800s.  For example, Ulysses S. Grant issued 217 
between 1869 and 1877.18  Grover Cleveland issued over 250 during his 
two non-consecutive terms in office in the late 1800s.19  And immediately 
preceding Roosevelt, President William McKinley did not shy away from 
using executive orders, issuing 185 of them, for an average of over forty per 
year.20  Thus, significant precedent for using executive orders existed prior 
to President Roosevelt, but not nearly as many compared to his average of 
140 per year.  Moreover, most of the early executive orders dealt mainly 
with administrative issues.21  During this early era in our nation’s history 
reigned a great suspicion of executive authority, so presidents were 
conscientiously circumspect in their use of executive power.  Certain 
exceptions arose, of course, such as Thomas Jefferson’s action doubling the 
size of the nation with the stroke of his pen through the Louisiana 
Purchase.22  Not until Abraham Lincoln issued executive orders in the 
1860s—such as the Emancipation Proclamation freeing the slaves in the 
secessionist states,23 and another suspending the writ of habeas corpus24—
did executive orders frequently because used for more substantive matters. 
In a dramatic departure from previous presidents, at the beginning of 
the Twentieth Century, Roosevelt became a champion for the unabashed 
use of substantive executive orders to make sweeping changes in law and 
policy, at times over the objections of the other branches of government.  
During his term between 1901 and 1909, he issued over 1000 executive 
 
18.  Id. 
19.  Id. 
20.  Id. 
21.  Branum, supra note 15, at 5 (“Originally, executive orders and other directives were 
used primarily as administrative tools.”). 
22.  Alissa C. Wetzel, Beyond the Zone of Twilight: How Congress and the Court Can 
Minimize the Dangers and Maximize the Benefits of Executive Orders, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 385, 
392-93 (2007) (explaining that “two important executive orders were issued prior to the Civil 
War. First, though seldom classified as such, President Thomas Jefferson’s Louisiana Purchase 
had all the markings of an executive order, since it was done unilaterally by Presidential order 
without direct statutory or Constitutional authority. Significantly, neither Congress nor the public 
challenged the Louisiana Purchase on the grounds that it was issued without Congressional 
authority.”) (citations omitted). 
23.  Branum, supra note 15, at 37. 
24.  Emanuel Margolis, National Security and the Constitution: A Titanic Collision, 81 
CONN. B.J. 271, 276; see Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. CASES 144 (Cir. Ct. Md. 1861) (holding that 
Congress alone was authorized to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and that President Lincoln’s 
executive order was therefore unconstitutional). 
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orders—864 more than any previous president.25  His aggressive use of this 
presidential power emboldened subsequent Presidents to follow suit.  For 
example, William Howard Taft, who immediately succeeded Roosevelt, 
issued 724 during his single term in office between 1909 and 1913.26  Taft 
was a lawyer by training and had served as an assistant prosecutor, as a 
state superior court judge, as the Solicitor General of the United States, and 
as a federal judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.27  
Therefore, he would have been very familiar with constitutional powers and 
constraints.  His actions demonstrate that he did not feel that the U.S. 
Constitution prohibited the president from issuing executive orders.  
Woodrow Wilson issued 1803 of them during his two terms in office 
between 1913 and 1921, during and following World War I.28  Although 
serving as president for less than two and one half years, William Harding 
issued a total of 522 executive orders.29  Calvin Coolidge issued 1203, and 
Herbert Hoover issued 968.30  Theodore Roosevelt’s younger cousin, 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, exceeded him by over 2500, putting into place 
3721 executive orders during the New Deal era.31 
From that high water mark, the use of executive orders has gradually 
tapered off to a certain extent.  For example, Harry S. Truman dropped the 
number of executive orders down to 907, and the use of executive orders 
again plummeted under Dwight D. Eisenhower to only 484.32  Since that 
time, Presidents have issued fewer than 400.  For example, George W. Bush 
issued 291, and Barack Obama had issued 276 by the end of his 
presidency.33 
B. THEODORE ROOSEVELT’S INCREASING USE OF EXECUTIVE ORDERS 
Examining the trajectory of presidential use of executive orders 
throughout the course of our nation’s history puts Roosevelt’s actions into a 
historical context.  Although he was by no means the first to use executive 
orders, he was certainly a pioneer in emphasizing their use, greatly 
 
25.  Peters & Woolley, supra note 11. 
26.  Id. 
27.  Stephen E. Hessler, The Story of Benjamin Cardozo, Learned Hand & the Southern 
District of New York, 47 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 191, 212 (2003); Donald F. Anderson, Building 
National Consensus: The Career of William Howard Taft, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 323, 325-26 (2000). 
28.  Peters & Woolley, supra note 11. 
29.  Id. 
30.  Id. 
31.  Id. 
32.  Id. 
33.  Id. 
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expanding the powers of the presidency in doing so.34  In part, he wanted to 
use this mechanism because he felt that if Congress was not acting when he 
believed it should—if the federal government was not taking steps to 
address a particular issue that Roosevelt thought was in the national 
interest—he surmised that he, as president, would need to take that power 
himself to resolve the problem.  As one mechanism for circumventing 
Congressional inaction, he would issue an executive order to ensure that the 
problem was addressed.  For example, consider conservation of the natural 
environment.35 
By way of background, before he became President, Roosevelt’s 
activities during the late 1800s—including his activities right here in North 
Dakota—placed him very well to lead the charge highlighting the plight of 
wildlife, fish, forests, and other natural resources from throughout the 
country.36  Of course, he had been a first-hand witness to the devastation of 
the bison that had occurred in the Dakotas and surrounding regions.37  At 
one point he wrote: “The extermination of the buffalo has been a veritable 
tragedy of the animal world.”38  While he served as Governor of New York, 
he developed a concern for forest lands.39  During the late 1800s, the nation 
also observed the increasing destruction of the migratory bird population 
 
34.  ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 8, at 434-35 
(“During the seven and a half years closing on March 4, 1909 [his last day in office], more was 
accomplished for the protection of wild life in the United States than during all of the previous 
years, excepting only the creation of the Yellowstone National Park.”). 
35.  Roosevelt was adamant about protecting the natural environment for future generations.  
See, e.g., EDMUND MORRIS, THEODORE REX 500 (Random House 2001) (“He repeated what he 
had said . . . about the gravity of the responsibility Americans had to pass on to their children a 
protected natural heritage.”). 
36.  ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 8, at 299.  As 
governor of New York, “I was able to do a good deal for forest preservation and the protection of 
our wild life.  All that I later strove for in the Nation in connection with Conservation was 
foreshadowed by what I was able to obtain for New York State when I was Governor.”  Id.  
Indeed, since his early childhood, he had always had an affinity for nature.  See PAUL RUSSELL 
CUTRIGHT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: THE MAKING OF A CONSERVATIONIST 1-13, 212 (1985) 
(“No other president—before or since—has been so well prepared for the task of inaugurating and 
implementing a comprehensive, aggressive, nationwide conservation program.”). 
37.  CUTRIGHT, supra note 36, at 161 (“[A]bove all else, he had been spectator to the rapid, 
remorseless destruction of the buffalo and other game animals, this causing him to cry out, ‘The 
frontier has come to an end, it has vanished.’”). 
38.  Oseid, supra note 3, at 131, 140 (“Gone forever are the mighty herds of the lordly 
buffalo.  A few solitary individuals and small bands are still to be found scattered here and there in 
the wilder parts of the plains . . . but the great herds . . . have vanished forever.  The extermination 
of the buffalo has been a veritable tragedy of the animal world.”). 
39.  ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 8, at 408 (“Like 
other men who had thought about the national future at all, I had been growing more and more 
concerned over the destruction of the forests.”); see also CUTRIGHT, supra note 36, at 199-207. 
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through hunting for their plumes, particularly in Florida.40  Many had also 
raised concern over the severe reduction in the population of other species, 
such as the passenger pigeon that had once been abundant.41  Moreover, 
public support was continually increasing for more vigorous action on the 
part of the federal government to reverse some of these negative trends. 
Toward the end of the Nineteenth Century, as a result of increasing 
awareness of the devastation that was happening to the environment, and 
particularly that was happening to fish and wildlife, the federal government 
created the Federal Office for the Commission of Fisheries42 and the 
Division of Economic Ornithology and Mammalogy, which later became 
the Department of Agriculture.43  These entities helped the nation gain 
better information about the damage to wildlife occurring throughout the 
country.44  From the studies that these agencies performed, it became very 
apparent that vast federal resources—and more specifically, the country’s 
natural resources—were in significant jeopardy.45  Around this timeframe, 
sportsman’s groups and conservation organizations began to lobby 
Congress, urging it to do something to alleviate these harms.46  For 
example, Roosevelt and numerous influential colleagues, including 
 
40.  ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 8, at 436 
(noting “the ruthless destruction of plume birds for the millinery trade”); see also CUTRIGHT, 
supra note 36, at 223. 
41.  Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, The Pioneer Spirit and the Public Trust: The 
American Rule of Capture and State Ownership of Wildlife, 35 ENVTL. L. 673, 691-92 (2005) 
(“The fate of the passenger pigeon vividly illustrates how early non-regulation of market hunting 
played out. At the time of America’s discovery, passenger pigeons ranged from the Atlantic Coast 
westward to the Rocky Mountains; their numbers were estimated in the billions. . . . By the mid-
1800s, this excessive hunting resulted in a marked reduction of passenger pigeons.  But most 
Americans refused to believe that the once bountiful species was in danger of extinction. . . .  A 
victim of America’s pro-capture mindset, the last wild passenger pigeon was shot in September of 
1908, and the last captive bird died in a Cincinnati zoo on September 1, 1914.”). 
42.  USFWS History, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE (Mar. 7, 2014), https://training.fws. 
gov/history/USFWS-history.html. 
43.  Origins of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE (Feb. 21, 
2014), https://training.fws.gov/history/TimelinesOrigins.html; see also History and Organization, 
USGS PATUXENT WILDLIFE RESEARCH CENTER (Aug. 1, 2011), https://www.pwrc.usgs.gov/ 
history/bsphist2.htm. 
44.  Sandra B. Zellmer, Wilderness Management in National Parks and Wildlife Refuges, 44 
ENVTL. L. 497, 512-13 (2014) (“The FWS [Fish and Wildlife Service] traces its origins back to 
1871, when Congress created the United States Commission on Fish and Fisheries in the 
Department of Commerce to study population declines of fish species harvested for food.  It also 
has roots in the Division of Economic Ornithology and Mammalogy, created in 1885 in the 
Department of Agriculture to study the effects of birds in controlling agricultural pests and to 
track the geographical distribution of animal and plant species throughout the country.”) (citations 
omitted). 
45.  Origins of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, supra note 43; see also History and 
Organization, supra note 43. 
46.  Jason Scott Johnston, The Tragedy of Centralization: The Political Economics of 
American Natural Resource Federalism, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 487, 540 n.123 (2003). 
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renowned figures in government, scientists, authors, and others, founded an 
organization in 1887 called the Boone and Crockett Club, named after early 
explorers and national icons Daniel Boone and Davy Crockett.47  Roosevelt 
became a prominent leader in this alliance.48 
Despite growing public support for preserving natural resources, 
Congress would not budge.  When Congress did not act to protect wildlife, 
Roosevelt became impatient.  He did not want to wait until Congress 
responded, if indeed it ever would.  As public concern increased, Roosevelt 
was exceedingly aware of the urgent necessity to manage natural resources 
more effectively and was at the forefront of the efforts to stem the losses of 
natural resources and the harms to the environment.49  Thus, when he 
became president in 1901 following the assassination of President William 
McKinley, the conservation-minded Roosevelt was aptly situated to take on 
the daunting problem of protecting the United States’ natural resources.50  
The following year, Roosevelt supported members of the Boone and 
Crockett Club in cultivating a proposal to establish a national network of 
wildlife refuges to help alleviate those problems.51  As the initial step in 
implementing this plan, President Roosevelt issued the very first executive 
order establishing a national wildlife refuge, in this instance, to preserve the 
habitat of the brown pelican and other types of birds.52  This order led to the 
creation of the Pelican Island National Wildlife Refuge along Florida’s 
Atlantic coast, a move that was also supported by the Florida Audubon 
Society.53  This was the earliest federal land specifically set apart to ensure 
 
47.  125-year Snapshot: Boone and Crocket Club 1887-2012, BOONE AND CROCKETT CLUB, 
http://www.boone-crockett.org/about/about_overview.asp?area=about (last visited Feb. 17, 2017); 
see also Thomas Lund, Nineteenth Century Wildlife Law: A Case Study of Elite Influence, 33 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 935, 945 (2001); see also Devin Kenney, A Goat Too Far?: State Authority To 
Translocate Species On And Off (And Around) Federal Land, 8 KY. J. EQUINE, AGRIC. & NAT. 
RESOURCES L. 303, 312 (2015-2016); see also CUTRIGHT, supra note 36, at 167 (“In 1887 he and 
George Bird Grinnell took the first steps in forming the Boone and Crockett Club”); see also id. at 
168-69. 
48.  Lund, supra note 47, at 945 (“When Theodore Roosevelt became President, Stewart 
Udall has pointed out, ‘the Boone and Crockett wildlife creed . . . became national policy.’”). 
49.  ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 8, at 422 (“The 
Conservation movement was a direct outgrowth of the forest movement.  It was nothing more than 
the application to our other natural resources of the principles which had been worked out in 
connection with the forests.  Without the basis of public sentiment which had been built up for the 
protection of the forests, and without the example of public foresight in the protection of this, one 
of the greatest natural resources, the Conservation movement would have been impossible.”). 
50.  Id. at 409. 
51.  125-year Snapshot: Boone and Crocket Club 1887-2012, supra note 47. 
52.  CUTRIGHT, supra note 36, at 233. 
53.  Pelican Island: History, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE (Oct. 14, 2015), 
https://www.fws.gov/refuge/pelican_island/about/history.html; see also J. Michael Scott et al., 
National Wildlife Refuge System: Ecological Context and Integrity, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1041, 
1042 (2004). 
         
2017] THE LEGACY OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT’S APPROACH 319 
the survival of a particular species.  Immensely enjoying his power, 
President Roosevelt “indeed delights in every aspect of his job: . . . in 
setting aside millions of acres of unspoiled land at the stroke of a pen (‘Is 
there any law that will prevent me from declaring Pelican Island a Federal 
Bird Reservation? . . . Very well, then I so declare it!’).”54 
This may seem like an insignificant initiative by itself, yet it was only 
the beginning of a major program developing a nationwide network of 
ecological preserves.  In the wake of this modest beginning at Pelican 
Island, Roosevelt issued a total of fifty-one executive orders to set aside 
federal lands for the protection of wild birds across seventeen states, as well 
as three territories.55  He also issued other executive orders advancing 
conservation initiatives.56  Responding to Roosevelt’s leadership and to 
public sentiment, Congress finally started to acquiesce.  For example, it 
established the first game preserves in the country in 1905—the Wichita 
Game Preserves.57  It passed the National Monuments Act in 1906—
preserving such icons as the Muir Woods in California and the Mount 
Olympus National Monument in Washington.58  It also created the National 
Bison Range in Montana in 1908.59  Currently, the National Wildlife 
Refuge System covers almost 94 million acres spread across more than 500 
refuges, in addition to several thousand waterfowl production areas.60  
Roosevelt also urged the creation of five additional national parks, 
including Sully Hill National Park near Devil’s Lake in North Dakota, 
which doubled the total number of national parks in the country.61 
 
54.  EDMUND MORRIS, THE RISE OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT 17 (Coward, McCann & 
Geoghegan, Inc., 1979). 
55.  ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 8, at 436; see 
also CUTRIGHT, supra note 36, at 223. 
56.  ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 8, at 424 (“The 
task of [the National Conservation Commission] was to prepare an inventory, the first ever made 
for any nation, of all the natural resources which underlay its property.  The making of this 
inventory was made possible by an Executive order which placed the resources of the Government 
Departments at the command of the Commission.”). 
57.  Id. at 435. 
58.  Id. 
59.  Id. at 436. 
60.  America’s National Wildlife Refuge System, U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, 
https://www.fws.gov/refuges100/facts/wpas.html.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2017) (“Nearly 95 
percent of waterfowl production areas are located in the prairie wetlands or ‘potholes’ of North 
and South Dakota, Minnesota, and Montana.  North Dakota alone is home to more than a third of 
the nation’s waterfowl production areas.  If wetlands in this vast prairie pothole region were not 
saved from drainage, hundreds of species of migratory birds would have been seriously threatened 
or become extinct. . . . Nearly 3,000 waterfowl production areas cover 668,000 acres nationwide.  
They average 223 acres in size.  The smallest is less than an acre (Medicine Lake WPA in North 
Dakota) and the largest is 3,733 acres (Kingsbury Lake WPA in Montana).”). 
61.  CUTRIGHT, supra note 36, at 225. 
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C. EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 
Executive orders are not at all mentioned in the U.S. Constitution.  This 
raises the question as to where presidents derive their authority to issue an 
executive order, as the U.S. Constitution does not explicitly give the 
president this power.  To respond to this question, a historical perspective 
on the separation of powers between the three branches of government 
helps to provide context.  The U.S. Constitution was preceded by the 
Articles of Confederation, the initial founding document establishing the 
United States government.62  The Articles of Confederation were 
intentionally constructed to establish a very limited central government.63  
At the start of our nation’s history, the founding fathers were very wary of 
their experiences with King George III of England and his heavy 
handedness in ruling the colonies from afar.64  They were concerned about 
tyrannical governments and about rulers who were too far removed from 
the people.65  Therefore, they wanted to develop a system of government 
that would preserve the powers of the people and keep governmental 
authority as close to the people as possible.  This was accomplished, in part, 
by reserving significant powers to the states and by maintaining a very 
limited role for the federal government. 
However, the new nation soon found that the Articles of Confederation 
had established such a weak central government that it caused a great deal 
of infighting among the states.66  The leaders of the new nation were 
worried that the United States would completely fall apart, and that their 
experiment of trying to found a new country would ultimately fail.67  So, 
they came together in Philadelphia for the Constitutional Convention and 
hammered out the new U.S. Constitution, which was adopted in 1787 and 
 
62.  James E. Hickey, Jr., Localism, History and the Articles of Confederation: Some 
Observations About the Beginnings of U.S. Federalism, 9 IUS GENTIUM 5, 23 (2003). 
63.  Id. at 12. 
64.  Id. at 9; Lee J. Strang, Originalism, the Declaration of Independence, and the 
Constitution: A Unique Role in Constitutional Interpretation?, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 413, 462 
(2006) (“The introduction sets forth the background against which the second part of the 
Declaration, the evidence of tyranny by the King, is judged.  The body of the Declaration provides 
evidence for the Declaration’s “indictment” of the King.  The list of “evils” visited by King 
George on the colonists consists of violations of the English constitution. . . . The final two 
paragraphs of the Declaration announce the separation of the colonies from the mother country.”) 
(citations omitted). 
65.  Hickey, Jr., supra note 62, at 9-10. 
66.  Daniel Stepanicich, Presidential Inaction and the Constitutional Basis for Executive 
Nonenforcement Discretion, 18 U. PA. J. CONST.L. 1507, 1515-16 (2016). 
67.  Steven T. Voigt, The General Welfare Clause: An Exploration of Original Intent and 
Constitutional Limits Pertaining to the Rapidly Expanding Federal Budget, 43 CREIGHTON L. 
REV. 543, 545 n.9 (2010). 
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ratified in 1788.68  Through this document, the founders attempted to 
structure the government to give more power to the national government—
because they did not want the nation to collapse, as it had been trending 
toward under the Articles of Confederation—but also to continue to have 
the federal government be one of limited powers.  Again, the founders were 
anxious about executive authority, having recently lived under the 
oppression of King George III, and they designed the second national 
charter—our current Constitution—with limited executive authority.69  
They were clearly in favor of legislative preeminence—the legislative 
branch would be the branch that spoke for the people of the United States.70  
The president was duty-bound to apply the will of the people as distilled 
through the legislative authority.  But did the founders truly circumscribe 
the executive power more so than the power of the legislative branch? 
Let’s look at the specific wording of the U.S. Constitution.  Article I 
establishes the legislative branch, assuming the place of prominence as the 
first section of the U.S. Constitution, because the legislature is the closest to 
the people.71  Citizens elect the members of the House of Representatives 
from their legislative districts within each state.72  Although the U.S. 
Constitution originally gave to the state legislatures the authority to elect 
the states’ two U.S. Senators,73 this power has now been granted directly to 
the people in each state through the Seventeenth Amendment.74  Either way, 
both chambers of the U.S. Congress were intended to reflect more closely 
the will of the general population than the executive or judicial branches of 
the federal government.  Because members of Congress have smaller 
constituencies than the president, who represents the entire nation, the 
legislature is deemed to be the closest branch to the people and the most 
highly representative of the peoples’ wishes. 
Article I vests those powers “herein granted” to the legislative 
branch—to Congress.75  Clause 1 of Article I reads: “All legislative Powers 
herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which 
 
68.  Alison L. LaCroix, The Authority for Federalism: Madison’s Negative and the Origins 
of Federal Ideology, 28 LAW & HIST. REV. 451, 461 (2010). 
69.  Hickey, Jr., supra note 62, at 15. 
70.  Id. at 20. 
71.  Id. 
72.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (“The House of Representatives shall be composed of 
Members chosen every second year by the People of the several States.”). 
73.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (“The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two 
Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof.”). 
74.  U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (“The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two 
Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof.”). 
75.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a 
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.”). 
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shall consist of a Senate and of a House of Representatives.”76  Stated 
another way, only those powers that are enumerated in the U.S. 
Constitution shall be assumed by the federal legislature.  Any other powers 
that are not delineated in the U.S. Constitution are reserved to the states or 
to the people, which was made explicit in the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution in 1791.77  Although the enumerated powers can either be 
express or implied, as elucidated in M’Culloch v. Maryland,78 they are 
nevertheless circumscribed, such that Congress has definite limitations 
beyond which it may not encroach. 
Article II, on the other hand, establishes the executive branch, and in 
particular, the presidency.79  Article II vests executive powers in the 
president, without the limiting “herein granted” clause.80  The first clause of 
Article II reads “The executive power shall be vested in a president of the 
United States of America.”81  It does not say, “The executive power herein 
granted shall be vested in the president of the United States of America.”  
Instead, it seems to provide a broad grant of all executive power without the 
limiting clause.82 
So what difference does this distinction make?  Over the years, many 
debates have ensued in terms of how much power this clause, without the 
limiting phrase, actually grants to the president.  Does it grant to the 
president additional or general executive powers that are not specifically 
listed in Article II?  Or does the president have only the powers that are 
indicated in the rest of Article II, and this clause simply provides an explicit 
granting of those powers listed in Article II to the president, which are still 
limited only to those powers?  This ambiguity has raised a question as to 
whether the president may have executive powers beyond those that are 
expressly granted under Article II of the U.S. Constitution.83  These 
questions have fostered an ongoing constitutional debate that remains 
 
76.  U.S. CONST. art. I. 
77.  U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people.”). 
78.  M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 361 (1819). 
79.  U.S. CONST. art. II. 
80.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the 
United States of America.”). 
81.  U.S. CONST. art. II, cl. 1. 
82.  Stepanicich, supra note 66, at 1519. 
83.  Neighbors, supra note 9, at 108 (“The principal issue is whether the executive power as 
set forth in section 1 of article II of the Constitution is a broad specific grant of power or is merely 
a summary of powers which are granted in the succeeding sections of the article.”). 
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relevant today concerning executive orders and other issues surrounding 
recent presidents who have made extensive use of presidential powers.84 
These issues came to the fore with President Roosevelt, when he vastly 
expanded the powers of the president, in part, through his extensive use of 
executive orders.85  Under the U.S. Constitution, the legislative power—the 
power to make law—is generally held by the legislative branch.86  By 
contrast, the power to give effect to those laws—to implement law—is held 
by the President.87  And the power to interpret or apply those laws lies with 
the judiciary, and ultimately with the Supreme Court.88  Even with this 
system of separation of powers, there is often a blending of powers, and the 
separation is not strict, but overlapping.89  The U.S. Constitution has been 
interpreted in ways such that each branch has attempted to aggrandize its 
own powers.90  For decades, this claim has arisen with respect to the 
judiciary, including concerns that the judicial branch has aggrandized itself 
and has taken on too much power.91  Claims of a unitary or imperial 
president, have also appeared, portending a president who has assumed too 
much executive power, including through the use of “presidential 
legislation” via executive orders.92  Interestingly, contrary claims also exist 
that—on the one hand Congress has appropriated too much power via 
federal legislation—and on the other hand, Congress is mired in federal 
gridlock where it should be taking action on issues but cannot, and 
therefore, is shirking its responsibilities and is not appropriately using its 
power when it should.93 
 
84.  Stepanicich, supra note 66, at 1519; see also Justin Pierce, Who Lets the Dogs Out?: A 
Look at Executive Authority to Wage War Without Prior Legislative Acquiescence, 1 GEO. J. L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 381, 386-87 (2003). 
85.  Kiyan Bigloo, Aggregation of Powers: Stem Cell Research and the Scope of Presidential 
Power Examined through the Lens of Executive Order Jurisprudence, 18 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & 
L. REV. 519, 531 (2012) (explaining that “presidents have not shied away from issuing executive 
orders to expand the powers of their office during times of relative peace.  President Theodore 
Roosevelt went further, perhaps, than any other president in declaring that he needed no ‘specific 
authorization’ for his powers but could ‘do anything that the needs of the nation demanded unless 
such action was forbidden by the Constitution or by the law.’”) (citations omitted). 
86.  Neighbors, supra note 9, at 105. 
87.  Id. 
88.  Id. 
89.  Id. 
90.  Id. 
91.  Id. (“The Judiciary, especially the United States Supreme Court, has been the most-
criticized branch for allegedly acting outside the scope of its constitutional authority.”). 
92.  Neighbors, supra note 9, at 106. 
93.  The Hon. Jerome LaBarre, Where Democracy Lives, 74 OR. ST. B. BULL. 70, 70 (2014) 
(“‘Congressional Gridlock.’ . . . ‘Americans Down On Government.’  These are frequent 
headlines in the news.  Recent polling data show that 95 percent of U.S. citizens simply do not 
believe that our democracy is working.”). 
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Of course, the president does have certain enumerated powers, such as 
the power as Commander in Chief, the power to issue pardons, and the 
power to enter into treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate.94  The 
U.S. Constitution, however, does not explicitly give the president the power 
to issue executive orders.  Therefore, when delivering executive orders, 
presidents usually claim either that they are promulgating the executive 
order pursuant to their powers granted by a particular statute, through which 
a statute delegates power to the executive branch, or if there is no explicit 
statutory delegation of power to the president, they may declare that they 
are issuing the executive order “By virtue of the authority vested in me as 
President of the United States.”95 
The fact that executive orders are not expressly mentioned in the U.S. 
Constitution does not necessarily mean that they are unconstitutional.96  The 
U.S. Constitution is one of the shortest, and oldest, written constitutions in 
the world.97  It provides a skeletal framework for our nation’s government, 
and was written that way, in part, to facilitate a great deal of flexibility with 
respect to our system of government.98  The U.S. Constitution has been 
amended only twenty-seven times in over 200 years.99  It is an ingenious 
document in terms of framing our government with enough specificity to 
enable the government to function, yet with enough malleability to allow 
 
94.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; Neighbors, supra note 9, at 105. 
95.  Neighbors, supra note 9, at 106 (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 3139 (Apr. 8, 1952)). 
96.  Erwin Chemerinsky, Controlling Inherent Presidential Power: Providing a Framework 
for Judicial Review, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 863, 873 (1983) (“[T]he belief that there is a need for the 
President to exercise powers not specifically enumerated in the Constitution or not expressly 
granted by Congress.  For example, the Constitution makes no mention of a Presidential power to 
recognize foreign governments or to remove Presidential appointees from office, nor has Congress 
ever granted such powers in a statute.  Yet it is conceded that the President does have these 
powers.  Inherent powers such as these are not objectionable so long as they do not disrupt the 
‘balance of powers’ among the branches; that is, action is allowed so long as one branch does not 
infringe on the authority of another.”) (citations omitted). 
97.  Wm. David Lytle, Celebrating the Constitution, 36-SEP COLO. LAW. 5, 5 (2007). 
98.  See M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819) (noting that “we must never forget that 
it is a constitution we are expounding. . . . This provision is made in a constitution intended to 
endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs.  
To have prescribed the means by which government should, in all future time, execute its powers, 
would have been to change, entirely, the character of the instrument, and give it the properties of a 
legal code.  It would have been an unwise attempt to provide, by immutable rules, for exigencies 
which, if foreseen at all, must have been seen dimly, and which can be best provided for as they 
occur.”).  For example, the Constitution is silent on the number of members of the Supreme Court, 
but the number has worked out to be nine.  Stephen R. Alton, From Marbury v. Madison to Bush 
v. Gore: 200 Years of Judicial Review in the United States, 8 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 7, 21 
(2001) (“The Constitution does not specify the number of justices who must serve on the United 
States Supreme Court.  Indeed, in the nation’s first century, Congress had by statute varied that 
number from as few as six to as many as ten justices.  But, since 1869, the number of justices had 
remained unchanged at nine—the very same number that serve today.”). 
99.  Lytle, supra note 97, at 5-6. 
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for the vast changes that we have seen in both our country and our world 
from the late 1700s through to the present.100  Therefore, many functions, 
roles, and activities of the federal government are not written into the text of 
the U.S. Constitution, but have evolved over time through precedent 
effectuated by the necessity of changing circumstances.  George 
Washington, John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and the other 
initial presidents had to figure out what a president is supposed to do and 
how a president faithfully executes the laws.  The use of executive orders is 
one manner in which presidents have attempted faithfully to execute the 
laws. 
Roosevelt was the first president under which the use of executive 
orders burgeoned, and the process for issuing them was still quite 
haphazard.101  In 1906, for example, there is an executive order that he 
would have signed, but it is not even dated.102  And sometimes throughout 
the early presidencies, the secretaries or cabinet members would write out 
an order that they wanted the president to issue, and the president would 
simply write “Approved” or “Let it be done” on the document.103  In 1935, 
under Franklin Delano Roosevelt—the president who issued the most 
executive orders by a vast margin—the federal government initially started 
to make the process for establishing executive orders much more 
regularized.104  Congress enacted a law and the president issued an 
executive order that, together, provided details in terms of how executive 
 
100.  Ian Bartrum, Constitutional Value Judgments and Interpretive Theory Choice, 40 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 259, 277 (2013) (“To survive in the face of rapidly changing cultural and 
technological development, a constitution must be flexible—it must bend so that it does not break.  
And this kind of flexibility is among the qualities we value most in our Constitution; its critical 
joints have enough play that we are able to avoid catastrophic political crises and incorporate even 
dramatically changed circumstances into the constitutional apparatus.  It is, in part, this very 
flexibility—and the value we place upon it—that makes constitutional interpretation necessary 
and controversial.”). 
101.  Sanjay Ranchod, The Clinton National Monuments: Protecting Ecosystems with the 
Antiquities Act, 25 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 535, 543 (2001) (discussing Theodore Roosevelt’s 
“unprecedented” number of executive orders); John C. Duncan, Jr., A Critical Consideration of 
Executive Orders: Glimmerings of Autopoiesis in the Executive Role, 35 VT. L. REV. 333, 349 
n.131 (2010) (citing KENNETH R. MAYER, WITH THE STROKE OF A PEN: EXECUTIVE ORDERS 
AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER, 66-67 (2001) (“Until the standardization of the format and 
publication of executive orders in the 1920s and 1930s, it was unclear which directives by the 
President constituted executive orders.  This uncertainty resulted in the haphazard issuance and 
recording of executive orders.  For example, the President might write ‘approved’ or ‘let it be 
done’ at the bottom of Cabinet members’ recommendations, or department heads might sign 
orders in place of the President, making it unclear which documents had the effect of an executive 
order.”)). 
102.  Neighbors, supra note 9, at 107. 
103.  Id. (quoting COMM. ON GOV’T OPERATIONS, 85TH CONG., EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND 
PROCLAMATIONS: A STUDY OF A USE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWERS 1 (Comm. Print 1957)). 
104.  Id. 
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orders would go forward in the future.105  For example, each executive 
order would be published in the Federal Register.106  Previously, anyone 
who wanted to find out what executive orders were currently in place would 
be required to hunt down whatever documentation existed to determine 
what executive orders had been issued by all of the presidents over the 
years, and whether they had been superseded.107  In response to this chaotic 
system, the initiative in 1935 significantly regularized the process.108  Of 
course, establishing a regularized course of action made it easier for 
presidents to issue more executive orders and increased the perception of 
this mechanism as a legitimate and constitutional use of presidential 
authority.  Since Congress gave its stamp of approval on the use of 
executive orders by passing a law regularizing the process for issuing them, 
a majority of people serving in the legislative branch also clearly believed 
that executive orders fell within the purview of presidential authority under 
the U.S. Constitution. 
D. THEORIES OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND EXECUTIVE ORDERS 
Several theories have emerged to explain the use of presidential power 
and how the president should execute that power while in office.  The most 
restrictive theory, sometimes known as the constitutional theory, holds that 
the president only has the powers that are explicitly designated to that office 
in the U.S. Constitution or given by Congress to the president.109  If a 
power has not been expressly delegated to the president in the text of the 
U.S. Constitution, then the president does not have that power, because—
just as with the legislature—the president is part of the federal government, 
and any powers not expressly listed in the U.S. Constitution are reserved to 
the states and to the people.110  Although President William Howard Taft 
 
105.  Id. 
106.  Id. 
107.  Fortunately, today such research is much easier.  In addition to being listed in the 
Federal Register since 1935, now anyone with access to the Internet can find many of them listed 
on-line.  Peters & Woolley, supra note 11. 
108.  Neighbors, supra note 9, at 107. 
109.  Id. at 108; ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 8, 
at 378 (“Other honorable and well-meaning Presidents . . . took the opposite and, as it seems to 
me, narrowly legalistic view that the President is the servant of Congress rather than of the people, 
and can do nothing, no matter how necessary it be to act, unless the Constitution explicitly 
commands the action.”). 
110.  ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 8, at 380 
(“These persons conscientiously believe that the President should solve every doubt in favor of 
inaction as against action, that he should construe strictly and narrowly the Constitutional grant of 
powers both to the National Government, and to the President within the National Government.”); 
see also Chemerinsky, supra note 96, at 871. 
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espoused this theory,111 his extensive use of executive orders belies this 
claim, at least with respect to this particular expansion of presidential 
authority.112 
An intermediate theory was embodied by President Roosevelt, labeled 
the “stewardship theory.”113  Under this theory, the president is supposed to 
act as the steward of the people.114  Therefore, as long as an action is not 
explicitly forbidden to the president under the U.S. Constitution or 
legislation, it is allowed.115  The president is able to take that action in 
furtherance of the good of the nation.116  If the U.S. Constitution or laws 
explicitly forbid the president from taking an action, then he cannot do it, 
but otherwise he is free to do so.117  He has broad executive powers, as can 
be seen in the difference between the first clauses of Article I and Article II, 
giving the legislature only those powers “herein granted,” yet giving the 
president executive powers without that limitation.118 
The third theory is an extension of the stewardship concept, and has 
been called the “presidential prerogative theory.”119  Under this theory, the 
president has the power to act at his discretion for the public good, not only 
without explicit legal authority, but sometimes even against legal or 
 
111.  Neighbors, supra note 9, at 108 (quoting WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, OUR CHIEF 
MAGISTRATE AND HIS POWERS 16 (1925 ed.) (“This constitutional theory is best summarized by 
the following quotation from Taft’s book, Our Chief Magistrate and His Powers: ‘The true view 
of the Executive function is, as I conceive it, that the President can exercise no power which 
cannot be fairly and reasonably traced to some specific grant of power or justly implied and 
included within such express grant as proper and necessary to exercise.’”). 
112.  Id. at 115 (noting that although Taft was supposedly an opponent to the stewardship 
theory, he still made use of an executive order in contravention of a federal statute). 
113.  Id. at 108; ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 8, 
at 371-72. 
114.  ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 8, at 371-72; 
THEODORE ROOSEVELT CYCLOPEDIA 466 (Albert Bushnell Hart & Herbert Ronald Ferleger eds., 
Roosevelt Mem’l Ass’n 1941). 
115.  Id. 
116.  Id. 
117.  Id. 
118.  See, e.g., Robert F. Turner, Understanding the Separation of Foreign Affairs Powers 
under the Constitution, 60-OCT N.Y. ST. B. J. 8, 10 (1988); see also Shayana Kadidal, Does 
Congress Have the Power to Limit the President’s Conduct of Detentions, Interrogations and 
Surveillance in the Context of War?, 11 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 23, 33 (2007) (“Could uncheckable 
authority over the battlefield derive from the idea that the Framers intended the president to 
exercise discretion in interpreting and enforcing the laws?  The textual source typically cited for 
this is the Vesting Clause: ‘The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States 
of America.’  The Vesting Clause could easily be seen as simply stating that the President has 
power to exercise all discretionary choices left to him by Congress.  However, the Clause is seen 
by advocates of executive power as implying inherent executive powers not enumerated in the 
Constitution, owing to the differences between it (‘The executive power’) and the Legislative 
Vesting Clause (‘All legislative powers herein granted’).  Alexander Hamilton was likely the first 
to make such an argument, and James Madison perhaps the first to refute it.”) (citations omitted). 
119.  See Neighbors, supra note 9, at 108. 
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constitutional mandates.120  For example, this expansive use of presidential 
authority arose during the Civil War, when the country was in the middle of 
a crisis.  The United States faced one of its most atrocious wars.  President 
Abraham Lincoln felt he must take action, even if that action was contrary 
to the U.S. Constitution—for example, his suspension of the writ of habeas 
corpus.121  He felt it was better to preserve the nation in violation of the 
U.S. Constitution, than to be faithful to the U.S. Constitution during a time 
of crisis and let the nation itself disintegrate.122  Of course, as a lawyer by 
profession, President Lincoln had a tremendous respect for the law and the 
U.S. Constitution, so he would not have taken this action lightly.123  In fact, 
one of the most renowned executive orders was his Emancipation 
Proclamation that freed the slaves.124  Yet even here, under his authority as 
Commander in Chief, he felt that he could only free the slaves in states that 
were in rebellion and remain consistent with the U.S. Constitution.125  He 
 
120.  Id. at 108-09. 
121.  Id. at 109 n.29 (“The most notable example of a President actually disregarding 
constitutional restrictions was Lincoln’s suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus. . . . These 
instances of questionable use of presidential power have occurred only in war-time or grave 
domestic crisis.  The Presidents have based this exercise of their power on what they believe are 
their inherent powers given them by the Constitution in Article II, § 1.”) (citation omitted). 
122.  Joseph A. Ranney, Abraham Lincoln’s Legacy to Wisconsin Law, Part 2: Inter Arma 
Silent Leges: Wisconsin Law in Wartime, 82-FEB WIS. LAW. 14, 16 (2009) (“Relying heavily on 
Article I, § 8 of the U.S. Constitution (which enumerates Congressional powers and prohibits the 
suspension of habeas corpus ‘unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may 
require it’), Taney issued an opinion declaring that only Congress, not the president, was 
empowered to suspend habeas.  Lincoln ignored Taney’s decision. In a subsequent message to 
Congress Lincoln tacitly acknowledged that Congress, not the president, had primary power over 
habeas but he made a powerful appeal to the laws of necessity and interpreted his presidential oath 
(which also is prescribed by the Constitution) to require him to preserve the government at all 
costs.  ‘[A]re all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces, lest 
that one be violated?’ Lincoln asked.  ‘Even in such a case, would not the official oath [to support 
the Constitution] be broken, if the government should be overthrown, when it was believed that 
disregarding the single law, would tend to preserve it?’”) (citations omitted). 
123.  ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 8, at 366 
(writing about President Lincoln’s actions in the 1860s in light of politically powerful members of 
Congress in the early 1900s, Roosevelt noted, “These men still from force of habit applauded what 
Lincoln had done in the way of radical dealing with the abuses of his day; but they did not apply 
the spirit in which Lincoln worked to the abuses of their own day.”). 
124.  John C. Duncan, Jr., A Critical Consideration of Executive Orders: Glimmerings of 
Autopoiesis in the Executive Role, 35 VT. L. REV. 333, 340 (2010) (“The President’s most famous 
executive order is the Emancipation Proclamation, issued September 22, 1862, and amended 
January 1, 1863, which proclaimed the freedom of currently enslaved residents of selected 
Confederate States.”). 
125.  Paul Finkelman, Lincoln, Emancipation, and the Limits of Constitutional Change, 2008 
SUP. CT. REV. 349, 385-86 (2008) (“On January 1, 1863, the final Proclamation was put into 
effect.  Here Lincoln made the constitutional argument even more precise.  He issued it ‘by virtue 
of the power in me vested as Commander-in-Chief, of the Army and Navy of the United States in 
time of actual armed rebellion.’  This was, constitutionally, a war measure designed to cripple the 
ability of those in rebellion to resist the lawful authority of the United States.  It applied only to 
those states and parts of states that were still in rebellion.  This was constitutionally essential. 
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did not free the slaves in the northern states because he saw his authority as 
constitutionally constrained.126  Therefore, although he normally abided by 
the stewardship theory,127 he was not afraid to take extraconstitutional 
action when necessary.  Thus, if a president does not have specific 
authority, or is even expressly forbidden from exercising certain powers, 
under the presidential prerogative theory, the president should still seize 
that authority when deemed in the best interests of the nation.  Again, this 
view has been attributed to Abraham Lincoln, and to a certain extent to 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman.128  With respect to 
President Lincoln, the nation was in crisis, but normally presidents would 
presumably not need to take that stance and would not do something so 
extreme as to act in direct contradiction to the U.S. Constitution.129 
Regarding these three theories, on one end of the spectrum is William 
Howard Taft, who viewed himself as a strict compliance executive who 
refused to stray from what he understood to be the enumerated powers of 
the president under the U.S. Constitution130—even though he made 
extensive use of executive orders, despite the fact that executive orders are 
not mentioned in the text of the U.S. Constitution.131  On the other end of 
 
Lincoln only had power to touch slavery where, as he had told the ministers from Chicago, he 
could not ‘enforce the Constitution.’  Where the Constitution was in force, federalism and the 
Fifth Amendment prevented presidential emancipation.  The document was narrowly written, 
carefully designed to withstand the scrutiny of the Supreme Court, still presided over by Chief 
Justice Taney.  It narrowly applied only to the states in rebellion.  It would not threaten Kentucky 
or Missouri and it would not threaten the constitutional relationship of the states and the federal 
government.”) (citations omitted). 
126.  I would like to extend my appreciation to Harry Lembeck for discussing these points 
during the symposium. 
127.  ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 8, at 378 
(“The course I followed, of regarding the executive as subject only to the people, and, under the 
Constitution, bound to serve the people affirmatively in cases where the Constitution does not 
explicitly forbid him to render the service, was substantially the course followed by both Andrew 
Jackson and Abraham Lincoln.”). 
128.  See Neighbors, supra note 9, at 108. 
129.  Id. at 110 (noting “[s]ome of the most serious constitutional problems arose during the 
Civil War under the presidency of Abraham Lincoln,” including the suspension of the writ of 
habeas corpus) (citing RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN (Rev. ed. 
1963)). 
130.  ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 8, at 378 
(“Other honorable and well-meaning Presidents, such as James Buchanan, took the opposite and, 
as it seems to me, narrowly legalistic view that the President is the servant of Congress rather than 
of the people, and can do nothing, no matter how necessary it be to act, unless the Constitution 
explicitly commands the action. . . . My successor in office [Taft] took this, the Buchanan, view of 
the President’s powers and duties.”). 
131.  Alissa C. Wetzel, Beyond the Zone of Twilight: How Congress and the Court Can 
Minimize the Dangers and Maximize the Benefits of Executive Orders, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 385, 
397-98 (2007) (“President Taft continued the trend of setting land aside, even without the 
statutory authority that Congress had been unwilling to provide.  Significantly, in U.S. v Midwest 
Oil Co., the Court upheld Taft’s decision to issue an executive order without Congressional 
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the spectrum is Abraham Lincoln, who decided that he was going to save 
the country, and if that meant he must explicitly contravene provisions of 
the U.S. Constitution—he did so anyway and was confident that his actions 
would be vindicated.132  Roosevelt stood in the middle, as a steward of the 
people and not espousing either extreme.  In his own words, he described 
his theory of presidential leadership: 
The most important factor in getting the right spirit in my 
Administration, next to the insistence upon courage, honesty, and a 
genuine democracy of desire to serve the plain people, was my 
insistence upon the theory that the executive power was limited 
only by specific restrictions and prohibitions appearing in the 
Constitution or imposed by the Congress under its Constitutional 
powers.  My view was that every executive officer, and above all 
every executive officer in high position, was a steward of the 
people bound actively and affirmatively to do all he could for the 
people, and not to content himself with the negative merit of 
keeping his talents undamaged in a napkin.  I declined to adopt the 
view that what was imperatively necessary for the Nation could 
not be done by the President unless he could find some specific 
authorization to do it.  My belief was that it was not only his right 
but his duty to do anything that the needs of the Nation demanded 
unless such action was forbidden by the Constitution or by the 
laws.  Under this interpretation of executive power I did and 
caused to be done many things not previously done by the 
President and the heads of the departments.  I did not usurp power, 
but I did greatly broaden the use of executive power.  In other 
words, I acted for the public welfare, I acted for the common well-
being of all our people, whenever and in whatever manner was 
necessary, unless prevented by direct constitutional or legislative 
prohibition.  I did not care a rap for the mere form and show of 
 
authority, holding that Congress had ‘acquiesced’ to Taft’s authority by failing to act itself.  
Known as the ‘acquiescence doctrine[,]’ the Court’s holding would come to be an important 
method for upholding executive orders in the face of legislative unwillingness to act.”) (citation 
omitted). 
132.  Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the Second 
Half-Century, 26 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 667, 726 (2003) (“In short, constitutional necessity 
provided its own justification. Whether his actions were legal or not, Lincoln undertook them, 
seemingly backed by the populace and the impetus of public exigency.  He trusted that Congress 
would later vindicate his decisions.  Further constitutional controversy was averted when, as 
Lincoln predicted, Congress and a sharply divided Supreme Court ratified all of Lincoln’s actions 
after the fact.  The only unilateral action Lincoln undertook that was not immediately authorized 
by Congress was his suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and even that was later ratified by 
Congress.”) (citation omitted). 
         
2017] THE LEGACY OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT’S APPROACH 331 
power; I cared immensely for the use that could be made of the 
substance.”133 
As another way of looking at executive orders—instead of viewing 
them as an expansion of executive authority, they could be seen as a self-
imposed restriction on executive authority.134  For example, when the 
federal government has authority to enter into contracts with vendors, the 
president could indicate that the executive branch will limit its own ability 
to enter into contracts only with vendors who pay their employees a 
specified minimum wage.  Another example is where the president 
mandates that the federal government will not allow private exploitation of 
the natural resources on certain federal lands, but instead will set them aside 
for the public good.135  Therefore, the executive branch is not expanding its 
authority, but instead is placing a limitation upon its own authority.  This 
technique is analogous to the Supreme Court’s approach to its own powers 
in Marbury v. Madison,136 the seminal case whereby the Supreme Court 
refused an expansion of its own power by Congress, indicating that such 
expanded authority would go beyond the limits of its powers granted under 
the U.S. Constitution.137  Its decision in Marbury was self-executing, 
because the Supreme Court needed merely not act—it did not need to rely 
upon the actions of another branch of government to enforce its decision.  
An example of this self-restraint by the president in exercising his role as 
the steward of the people was Roosevelt’s approach to issues concerning 
Native Americans.  In his autobiography, he explained: 
In connection with the Indians, by the way, it was again and again 
necessary to assert the position of the President as steward of the 
whole people. . . On one occasion, for example, Congress passed a 
 
133.  ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 8, at 371-72. 
134.  I would like to extend my thanks to Stephen Sepinuck, Associate Dean for 
Administration, Gonzaga University School of Law, who suggested these ideas during the 2016 
Annual Scholarship Conference of the Central States Law Schools Association, held at the 
University of North Dakota School of Law on September 23-24, 2016. 
135.  ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 8, at 378 (“I 
acted on the theory that the President could at any time in his discretion withdraw from entry any 
of the public lands of the United States and reserve the same for forestry, for water-power sites, 
for irrigation, and other public purposes.  Without such action it would have been impossible to 
stop the activity of the land thieves.”). 
136.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 174-75 (1803).  Interestingly, this case involved a 
dispute over an executive order.  Neighbors, supra note 9, at 108 (“The first case in modern 
constitutional law, Marbury v. Madison, was precipitated by an ‘executive order.’  The order in 
question was President Thomas Jefferson’s order to Secretary of State James Madison to withhold 
a judicial commission from William Marbury.”) (citation omitted). 
137.  Marbury, 5 U.S. at 176 (“The authority, therefore, given to the Supreme Court, by the 
act establishing the judicial courts of the United States, to issue writs of mandamus to public 
officers, appears not to be warranted by the constitution.”). 
         
332 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 92: 309 
bill to sell to settlers about half a million acres of Indian land in 
Oklahoma at one and a half dollars an acre.  I refused to sign it, 
and turned the matter over to [Indian Commissioner] Leupp.  The 
bill was accordingly withdrawn, amended to as to safeguard the 
welfare of the Indians, and the minimum price raised to five 
dollars an acre.  Then I signed the bill.  We sold that land under 
sealed bids, and realized for the Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache 
Indians more than four million dollars—three millions and a 
quarter more than they would have obtained if I had signed the bill 
in its original form.138 
Although many executive orders could be viewed as self-imposed 
restrictions on the executive branch’s own power (such as restricting its 
own ability to enter into contracts, or limiting the use of federal lands), 
others clearly cannot (such as the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus).   
Roosevelt deemed that, so long as an action was not forbidden to him 
under the U.S. Constitution, he would go ahead and take that action and see 
what transpired, both with respect to his reelection and with respect to 
whether the Supreme Court would deem the action to be unconstitutional.139  
If he took an action as president, and the Supreme Court did not strike it 
down as unconstitutional, then logically it must be constitutional.140  This is 
an example of a situation where the practice of government—the practice of 
presidents, for example—if unchallenged by the other branches or by 
affected people, has enabled the government’s power to evolve.  Of course, 
people working in any branch of government have the responsibility to 
interpret and apply the U.S. Constitution, so they fully utilize the authority 
granted to them by the U.S. Constitution yet remain within the bounds of 
their authority.  The Supreme Court only steps in when a case is brought 
before it to determine whether those interpretations by others are correct.  
As a practical matter, if no one brings a challenge against a president’s 
action, or if someone brings a challenge and the court defers to the 
president, then precedent is established that the president can take that 
 
138.  ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 8, at 377. 
139.  Id. (regarding another action Roosevelt had taken with respect to Native Americans, he 
opined, “[a] subsequent bill was passed on the lines laid down by the Indian Bureau [which he 
supported after vetoing a previous bill], referring the whole controversy to the courts, and the 
Supreme Court in the end justified our position.”). 
140.  Branum, supra note 15, at 59-60 (“In contrast to the number of presidential directives 
issued, few challenges have been made.  Even when challenges are brought, the most notable 
contribution of the courts has been its reluctance to get involved.  Typically, courts uphold the 
presidential directive, find that the plaintiff lacks standing, or hold that the dispute revolves 
around a political question that should not be judicially resolved.”) (citation omitted). 
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authority.141  And once the precedent has been set, the president and future 
presidents will undoubtedly continue to retain that authority as a tool in 
their toolbox, magnifying their authority under the constitution a little more 
each time such an expansion of authority is exerted.  At times, Congress 
will also subsequently validate a president’s use of power that was not 
previously indicated expressly.142 
E. HISTORICAL CONTEXT SHAPING THEODORE ROOSEVELT’S 
EXPANSION OF EXECUTIVE POWER 
As discussed above, President Roosevelt regarded himself as a trustee 
of the lands that were owned by the people via the federal government and 
felt that such lands should be put to public use instead of exploited by 
private interests.143  This role was both his prerogative and his duty.  He 
was convinced that he needed to stop the activity of the “land thieves,”144 as 
he called them, and to reserve the best of the country’s national lands for 
permanent public use.145  He unequivocally rejected the narrowly legalistic 
view of his predecessors that he could function only when a statute gave 
him the authority to do so.  Roosevelt was a servant of the people, not of 
Congress, and the charter to which he looked for that power was the U.S. 
Constitution itself.146  As another example of an executive order by 
Roosevelt with sweeping consequences, “[i]n 1907, the area of the National 
Forests was increased by Presidential proclamation more than forty-three 
million acres.”147 
 
141.  ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 8, at 378 (“I 
acted on the theory that the President could at any time in his discretion withdraw from entry any 
of the public lands of the United States and reserve the same for forestry, for water-power sites, 
for irrigation, and other public purposes.  Without such action it would have been impossible to 
stop the activity of the land thieves.  No one ventured to test its legality by lawsuit.”). 
142.  Id. at 379 (“Again Congress showed its wisdom by passing a law which gave the 
President the power which he had long exercised.”). 
143.  Id. at 416-17 (“[T]he rights of the public to the natural resources outweigh private 
rights, and must be given its first consideration.  Until [Roosevelt restructured the executive 
branch], in dealing with the National Forests, and the public lands generally, private rights had 
almost uniformly been allowed to overbalance public rights.  The change we made was right, and 
was vitally necessary; but, of course, it created bitter opposition from private interests.”). 
144.  Id. at 378. 
145.  Id. at 374, 378 (“Through Francis Heney I was prosecuting men who were implicated 
in a vast network of conspiracy against the law in connection with the theft of public land in 
Oregon.”). 
146.  Id. at 380-81 (“The President’s duty is to act so that he himself and his subordinates 
shall be able to do efficient work for the people, and this efficient work he and they cannot do if 
Congress is permitted to undertake the task of making up his mind for him as to how he shall 
perform what is clearly his sole duty.”). 
147.  ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 8, at 418. 
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Many of Roosevelt’s critics, and even supporters, thought he was 
magnifying his lawmaking clout in an exceedingly dangerous manner, so he 
certainly did not have the entire country’s support behind him.148  When 
President Roosevelt wanted to establish national wildlife refuges, parks, and 
monuments, and to preserve public lands from exploitation by private 
interests, his ideas had staunch opponents in some leading members of 
Congress.149  For example, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, 
Joseph Cannon of Illinois, infamously claimed, “[n]ot one cent for 
scenery!”150  It is important to keep in mind that Speaker Cannon also ruled 
the House with an iron fist.151  This one man singlehandedly set the agenda 
for the House, only allowing debate and action on legislative proposals that 
he supported.152  Through a blatant patronage system, he appointed his 
supporters as committee chairs and punished his opponents, thereby 
neutralizing their efficacy.153  So, the Congress of the United States—under 
the command of Speaker Cannon—was not interested in President 
Roosevelt’s conservation measures. 
In light of his hegemony, the legislature, under the domination of 
“Uncle Joe,” as he was called, was not as representative of the people as the 
 
148.  See, e.g., Marc Landy, Incrementalism v. Disjuncture: The President and American 
Political Development, 50 TULSA L. REV. 635, 646 (2015) (“William Howard Taft’s ‘Anti-
Greatness’ lay in his efforts to curb what he took to be the unconstitutional excesses of his 
predecessor Theodore Roosevelt.  TR had repudiated the strict reading of the Constitution to which 
all his predecessors had at least paid lip service.  Instead of limiting the powers of the federal 
government to those expressly enumerated in that document, he believed that the document should 
be interpreted to permit the federal government to do whatever the Constitution did not expressly 
forbid, as long as those actions were in the public interest.  Taft sought to revive the earlier, 
restrictive understanding.  He was especially critical of TR’s extensive use of executive orders to 
withdraw public lands for conservation purposes.  Such policies were legislative in nature and 
therefore required congressional not presidential action.”) (citation omitted). 
149.  ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 8, at 422 
(stating “[t]he refusal of Congress to act in the public interest was solely responsible for keeping 
these lands from entry”). 
150.  Tom Udall, Foreword, 56 NAT. RESOURCES J. vii (2016) (“We have come a long way 
from the days of Teddy Roosevelt, when House Speaker Joe Cannon famously said, ‘Not one cent 
for scenery!’”  That seems ridiculous to us now.  It probably was ridiculous to a lot of folks even 
then.”). 
151.  Ivan Ermakoff, Patrimony and Collective Capacity: An Analytical Outline, 636 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 182, 187-88 (2011). 
152.  See, e.g., Margaret Sanregret Shockley, “Cannonizing” Under Newt Gingrich: The 
Speaker’s Consolidation of Power in the House of Representatives, 9 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 165 
(1998) (“The turn of the century brought a steady rise in power of the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives that reached its peak during the Speakership of Joseph Gurney Cannon (R-IL).  
During Cannon’s reign as Speaker from 1903 to 1911, House power was virtually consolidated 
into one person—the Speaker.  Cannon’s unbridled reign and successful manipulation of House 
procedure to implement his personal agenda resulted in a House revolt led by House Democrats 
and empowered by Progressive House Republicans.”). 
153.  Id. 
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founding fathers may have anticipated.154  The Federalists—Jefferson, 
Madison, and other early proponents of limited government authority—may 
have intended that if Congress has decided it is not interested in an issue, it 
is not for the president to surpass the sovereignty of Congress and take up 
that issue by the sole authority of the powers vested in the executive office.  
Yet perhaps if they had anticipated a heavy-handed authoritarian leader 
controlling the legislative branch—a perceived tyrant who was 
championing the interests of a handful of wealthy tycoons wanting to 
pillage the nation’s national resources and pocket the profits for themselves 
instead of for the public good—under those circumstances the founders 
may have wanted a strong president to serve as a counterweight.  While 
President Roosevelt attempted to press through progressive measures, 
Speaker Cannon and his colleagues continued to block them.155 
In political debates, one often hears a mantra, by whomever is 
frustrated with one of the branches of the federal government, that we 
should go back to the intent of the founders and live according to the 
founders’ vision of government and society.  Yet, it is important to 
remember that the founders’ vision of society was that it is ever changing, 
and their vision of the U.S. Constitution was that it must be sufficiently 
flexible in order to meet the ever changing needs of the nation.  As Chief 
Justice John Marshall expounded in McCulloch v. Maryland, the U.S. 
Constitution is a malleable document.156  The words of the U.S. 
Constitution are the same today as they were in 1889, with the exception of 
the twenty-seven amendments that have modified specific portions of the 
original document.157  Therefore, the U.S. Constitution today is largely the 
same as it was at the start of our country; although amendments have 
changed it in some vitally important ways.  It is a skeletal framework for 
how our government should function, and although the ways in which that 
 
154.  Id. 
155.  ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 8, at 367 (“We 
succeeded in working together . . . for some years, I pushing forward and they hanging back.  
Gradually, however, I was forced to abandon the effort to persuade them to come my way, and 
then I achieved results only by appealing over the heads of the Senate and House leaders to the 
people, who were the masters of both of us.  I continued in this way to get results until almost the 
close of my term.”). 
156.  M’Culloch, 17 U.S. at 407 (explaining that “we must never forget that it is a 
constitution we are expounding. . . . This provision is made in a constitution intended to endure for 
ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs.  To have 
prescribed the means by which government should, in all future time, execute its powers, would 
have been to change, entirely, the character of the instrument, and give it the properties of a legal 
code.  It would have been an unwise attempt to provide, by immutable rules, for exigencies which, 
if foreseen at all, must have been seen dimly, and which can be best provided for as they occur.”). 
157.  Richard Albert, American Exceptionalism in Constitutional Amendment, 69 ARK. L. 
REV. 217, 224 (2016). 
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skeleton have been fleshed out have evolved over the years, the skeleton 
created by the founders endures. 
There are many ways in which one could interpret the words in our 
written U.S. Constitution.  Because it is skeletal, it does not explicitly list 
all of the powers granted to, and all of the restrictions upon, any of the 
branches of government.158  Roosevelt, therefore, interpreted the U.S. 
Constitution to provide himself with authority to issue substantive executive 
orders.  If Speaker Joseph Cannon was going to put a hold on legislation for 
the public good—for example, for scenery that was so grand that Roosevelt 
felt it should have national prominence and protection—then Roosevelt was 
going to take that authority for himself under the power that was granted to 
him as the chief executive.159  The president must interpret the U.S. 
Constitution to try to determine the extent of his or her powers, the 
legislature must interpret the U.S. Constitution to try to determine the extent 
of its powers, and the judiciary must interpret the U.S. Constitution—not 
only to determine the extent of its powers, but also using the doctrine of 
judicial review to resolve whether the president and Congress have 
exceeded their powers under the U.S. Constitution.  The president can 
conclude that when he perceives a need to take a particular action, and 
considers such an action to be constitutional, he can take that action.  The 
only thing that would hold back the president in this situation is if someone 
challenged that action in court, and the federal courts using their power of 
judicial review decided the action contravenes the U.S. Constitution.160  In 
his autobiography, Roosevelt wrote: 
In a number of instances the legality of executive acts of my 
Administration was brought before the courts.  They were 
uniformly sustained.  For example, prior to 1907 statutes relating 
 
158.  This not only pertains to the separation of powers at the federal level, but also with 
respect to the powers of the federal government vis-à-vis the states.  Those who are in favor of 
states’ rights would want to go back in time and assert that the federal government as a whole has 
too much power today.  They advocate that we should decentralize the power of the federal 
government and devolve that power back onto the states. 
159.  ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 8, at 420 
(While discussing “[t]he idea that the Executive is the steward of public welfare,” Roosevelt 
indicated that “The laws were often insufficient, and it became well nigh impossible to get them 
amended in the public interest when once the representatives of privilege in Congress grasped the 
fact that I would sign no amendment that contained anything not in the public interest.  It was 
necessary to use what law was already in existence, and then further to supplement it by Executive 
action.”). 
160.  Unless something is expressly permitted (“The President. . . shall have Power to grant 
Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States. . . .” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.) 
or expressly forbidden in the Constitution (“No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be 
passed. . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.), it would be rare that there could not be a debate about a 
particular issue and good arguments made on both sides. 
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to the disposition of coal lands had been construed as fixing the 
flat price at $10 to $20 per acre.  The result was that valuable coal 
lands were being sold for wholly inadequate prices, chiefly to big 
corporations.  By executive order the coal lands were withdrawn 
and not opened for entry until proper classification was placed 
thereon by Government agents.  There was a great clamor that I 
was usurping legislative power; but the acts were not assailed in 
court until we brought suits to set aside entries made by persons 
and associations to obtain larger areas than the statutes authorized.  
This position was opposed on the ground that the restrictions 
imposed were illegal; that the executive orders were illegal.  The 
Supreme Court sustained the Government.  In the same way our 
attitude in the water power question was sustained, the Supreme 
Court holding that the Federal Government had the rights we 
claimed over streams that are or may be declared navigable by 
Congress.  Again, when Oklahoma became a State we were 
obliged to use the executive power to protect Indian rights and 
property, for there had been an enormous amount of fraud in the 
obtaining of Indian lands by white men.  Here we were denounced 
as usurping power over a State as well as usurping power that did 
not belong to the executive.  The Supreme Court sustained our 
action.161 
Roosevelt, although he had a massive personality, probably did not 
intend to set himself up as a new American monarch, seizing as much 
power for the presidency as he could muster.  In fact, his primary concern 
was for the common person, as opposed to the upper class,162 and for 
wildlife preservation in the face of large corporate interests.163  Roosevelt 
was a strong believer in democracy, in the will of the people, and in the 
legislature as the representative of the people.  For example, he was very 
supportive of state legislatures taking action to further progressive 
causes.164  He was very supportive of the will of the people acting through 
 
161.  ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 8, at 376-77. 
162.  Id. at 417 (“One of the principles whose application was the source of much hostility 
was this: It is better for the Government to help a poor man make a living for his family than to 
help a rich man make more profit for his company.”). 
163.  Id. at 434 (“Even more important was the taking of steps to preserve from destruction 
beautiful and wonderful wild creatures whose existence was threatened by greed and 
wantonness.”). 
164.  See, e.g., Victoria F. Nourse, A Tale of Two Lochners: The Untold History of 
Substantive Due Process and the Idea of Fundamental Rights, 97 CAL. L. REV. 751, 780 (2009) 
(discussing Roosevelt’s attack on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Lochner, striking down a 
progressive New York statute: “The Court had struck down the law, despite the approval of the 
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their elective representatives to solve the problems of the times.  Although 
he may certainly have enjoyed the significant powers that the U.S. 
Constitution bestowed upon the president and exercised them to the fullest 
to accomplish his objectives, it is doubtful that his intent would have been 
to contravene the U.S. Constitution and take powers that were clearly 
beyond those granted to the executive.  His primary concern was for the 
public good, and if Congress refused to act or was incapable of acting, that 
was when he felt the need to step up and take the power granted to the 
executive under the U.S. Constitution and take action. 
Roosevelt’s detractors feared that he had magnified his own power in 
ways that made him too independent of the separation of powers and checks 
and balances so carefully laid out in the U.S. Constitution, even if such 
powers were theoretically permissible under its text.  Yet, one must 
remember that when the country first emerged, government, society, the 
economy, the military, and most other aspects of life were much simpler.  
Shortly after the country’s founding, the federal government had fewer than 
3000 employees.165  During the nation’s transformation from a primarily 
agrarian and rural country to a largely industrialized and increasingly urban 
country, the federal government correspondingly burgeoned to deal with the 
rapidly growing and increasingly complex problems of the nation.166  
Shortly after Roosevelt’s presidency, the number of civilian employees had 
increased to nearly 400,000 in 1916.167  Fast-forward to the present time, 
and the federal government consists of over 2,600,000 civilian employees 
in the executive branch alone (not taking into account military employees, 
 
New York legislature and the New York courts, on the theory of a ‘liberty to work under 
unhygienic conditions.’  It was a decision ‘nominally against State rights . . . but really against 
popular rights, against the democratic principle of government by the people under the forms of 
law.’”) (citation omitted). 
165.  STAFF OF CONG. BUDGET OFF., 95TH CONG., THE FEDERAL WORK FORCE: ITS SIZE, 
COST AND ACTIVITIES 1 (Mar. 1977), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/95th-congress-1977-
1978/reports/77doc720.pdf (“The federal government, as organized in 1789, consisted of the 
Departments of State, Treasury, and War; plus the Office of the Attorney General.  In 1792 the 
Post Office was added; and a separate Department of the Navy was established in 1798.  By 1800 
the number of people working in these various departments had reached an estimated 3,000 
employees.”) (citation omitted). 
166.  Id. at 2 (“During the years between the end of the Civil War and the end of World War 
I, the United States changed from a rural, agrarian society into an industrial, increasingly urban 
society.”). 
167.  Id. at 3 (“Civilian staffing of the executive branch increased substantially during this 
period. Total staffing in 1916, just prior to the large buildup associated with World War I, was 
391,000—a 1,000 percent increase from 1861.  The Post Office Department still represented the 
largest component (212,000), but the staffing for other federal activities had grown much more 
rapidly than the Post Office Department during the period.”). 
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which number around 1,500,000).168  For the president to manage such an 
enormous bureaucracy and that massive number of employees—most of 
whom are in the executive branch—the president needs to be able to 
exercise considerably more power than the president had to do so when 
there were only 3000 employees and he led a much simpler governmental 
system.  So, by virtue of the fact that our society, our country, and the world 
have become so much more complex, all three branches of government 
have significantly expanded their powers and authorities under the U.S. 
Constitution to survive in modern times.169 
Passionate debates continue to this day about the benefits of federalism 
and a strong national government versus the benefits of decentralization and 
strong state governments.  These debates reflect those that occurred at the 
founding of the country—both during the intentionally weak federal 
government and much stronger state governments under the Articles of 
Confederation, and during the debates surrounding the Constitutional 
Convention establishing a stronger federal government so the country 
would not collapse.  If the United States had a federal government today as 
in its infancy, with only several thousand employees, the country could not 
function, because the present is so much more complex. 
Roosevelt became president at the beginning of the Twentieth Century, 
when vast changes were taking place within society and the economy, and 
the government needed more resources to be able to respond to those 
changes.170  Industrialization, urbanization, and the expansion of major 
corporations were all occurring around the time that Roosevelt was in 
office.171  Many of the wealthy elite and corporate interests were attempting 
to plunder public lands for their own private interests.172  He intended to 
ameliorate some of the problems caused by industrialization and 
urbanization, which other leaders at the time, such as Jane Addams, were 
 
168.  OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MGMT., Historical Federal Workforce Tables, 
https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/data-analysis-documentation/federal-employment-
reports/historical-tables/total-government-employment-since-1962/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2017). 
169.  Neighbors, supra note 9, at 105-06 (“The office of the President has been expanded 
both as to numbers and varieties of activities which are carried out by the President.  This increase 
in executive power is an outgrowth of both hot and cold wars, economic crises and the multitude 
of complex problems which confront the highly industrialized American society.”). 
170.  STAFF OF CONG. BUDGET OFF., 95TH CONG., supra note 165, at 2 (“The growth of the 
modern corporation and its domination of large segments of the economy also brought a major 
addition to the federal government’s administrative machinery.”). 
171.  ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 8, at 437. 
172.  Id. at 425 (“Throughout the early part of my Administration the public land policy was 
chiefly directed to the defense of the public lands against fraud and theft.”). 
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trying to address.173  The increase in the nation’s population also put great 
pressure on the country’s natural resources, which Roosevelt championed.  
As described above, he addressed wildlife devastation and the potential 
threats to the nation’s lands through executive orders and other initiatives, 
which have left a wonderful legacy through the national parks, monuments, 
and wildlife refuges.174  Because of the increasing complexity and 
increasing problems that the nation has had to address, by virtue of 
necessity, the federal government has had to increase the use of its powers.  
Of course, every time the government does so, one can expect pushback.  
There will be claims of presidential tyranny and the unitary executive, of 
legislative tyranny wherein Congress is taking on too much power, and 
judicial tyranny via the activist courts. 
Roosevelt was certainly willing to push the envelope with respect to 
interpreting the U.S. Constitution’s grant of executive authority.  However, 
when considered as one episode along the course of the nation’s history, 
Roosevelt’s actions could be seen as fitting squarely within an American 
tradition and its flexible U.S. Constitution that allows a certain amount of 
fluctuation back and forth with respect to presidential power vis–à–vis that 
of the other branches of government.  At the turn of the Twentieth Century, 
his actions would have raised numerous red flags, because he was taking 
initiatives that had not been done before.  But if one considers his actions 
through the perspective of the course of time, they could be considered as 
measured steps that were calculated to push against, yet not rupture, the 
bounds of the U.S. Constitution.175 
F. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF EXECUTIVE ORDERS 
Presidents have issued many other executive orders throughout 
history—some clearly in the public interest, and some that have not been 
viewed as charitably under the gaze of time.  For example, a later-maligned 
executive order was Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s initiative in 1942 
 
173.  William E. Forbath, The Distributive Constitution and Workers’ Rights, 72 OHIO ST. L. 
J. 1115, 1125 (2011) (“Figures like Teddy Roosevelt, Louis Brandeis, Jane Addams, and Herbert 
Croly insisted that the United States could not remain a constitutional republic without social and 
economic reform.  Overwork, joblessness, material insecurity, tyrannical workplaces, and a lack 
of decent housing and education left the nation’s working classes ill-equipped for democratic 
citizenship. America was becoming a corporate oligarchy; working people were wage slaves, 
ciphers, and servants.”) (citation omitted). 
174.  ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 8, at 435-36. 
175.  Neighbors, supra note 9, at 118 (“[I]t is nonetheless quite obvious that Presidents who 
are considered “great Presidents” have made the greatest use of the executive order thereby 
permitting the country to move forward and to solve the problems confronting it.”). 
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mandating the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II.176  
This action is now widely perceived to be a negative mark, not only on the 
presidency but also on the Supreme Court, which upheld that order in a 
decision that has subsequently been strongly criticized.177 
Although executive orders are not unconstitutional per se, they may be 
declared unconstitutional by the courts, if the president uses this mechanism 
to go beyond executive authority with a particular action.178  Another 
infamous executive order was issued by President Harry S. Truman, which 
was reviewed by the U.S. Supreme Court in what is known as the Steel 
Seizure Case in 1952 during the Korean War.179  Employees working in 
steel factories across the United States had threatened to strike as a result of 
a labor dispute with the management of the companies.180  President 
Truman was afraid that steel production would grind to a halt.  The country 
was involved in a war, and he was concerned that a strike would affect the 
war effort.181  Therefore, using his power as Commander in Chief, he issued 
an executive order to his secretary of commerce, commanding the secretary 
to take over the operation of all of the steel mills within the United States to 
prevent the labor stoppage and to keep the steel mills open.182  When the 
federal government began running the private steel mills, the companies’ 
leaders caused an uproar, and quickly brought a lawsuit up to the U.S. 
Supreme Court.183 
 
176.  Branum, supra note 15, at 28. 
177.  Craig Green, Ending The Korematsu Era: An Early View from The War on Terror 
Cases, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. 983, 985 (“Every American lawyer knows Korematsu v. United States 
as a discredited precedent.”). 
178.  Neighbors, supra note 9, at 112. 
179.  Id.; see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
180.  Kimberley L. Fletcher, The Court’s Decisive Hand Shapes the Executive’s Foreign 
Affairs Policymaking Power, 73 MD. L. REV. 247, 267 (2013). 
181.  Jason Hart, To Preserve, Protect, and Defend: An Imminent Threat Approach to 
Resolving the Question of Inherent Powers After ACLU v. NSA, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 315, 322 
(2007) (“Fearing that such a strike would endanger American lives and national security by 
paralyzing the steel industry, Truman authorized the Federal Government to nationalize the steel 
mills, thereby placing the steel industry under government control”). 
182.  Id. (“Specifically, Truman’s order directed the Secretary of Commerce to take 
possession of the steel mills.  To accomplish this end, the Secretary ordered the presidents of the 
seized companies to serve as operating managers of the mills pursuant to his instructions.”) 
(citation omitted). 
183.  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 582-84; Fletcher, supra note 180, at 267 
(“This announcement was met with uniform shock.”).  The media also reacted extremely 
negatively to Truman’s action.  Charles C. Hileman et.al, Supreme Court Law Clerks’ 
Recollections of October Term 1951, Including the Steel Seizure Cases, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 
1239, 1265 (2008) (“The response to this action by President Truman was swift and negative. The 
Chicago Daily News called it ‘leaping socialism.’  The New York Daily News said ‘Hitler and 
Mussolini would have loved this.’  The Washington Post wrote, ‘President Truman’s seizure of 
the steel industry will probably go down in history as one of the most high-handed acts committed 
by an American President.’”). 
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The Supreme Court needed to establish an approach for determining 
the constitutionality of executive orders—whether a particular executive 
order would be considered within the authority of the president.184  The 
majority held that President Truman’s executive order indeed overstepped 
the bounds of authority of the president.185  Issuing an executive order to 
take over private corporations was too far removed from the president’s 
power as Commander in Chief to be deemed a legitimate use of that 
power.186  However, the majority opinion was not the most influential 
opinion arising out of the Steel Seizure Case.187  Instead, the concurring 
opinion by Justice Jackson has become the seminal opinion.188  He 
delineated three categories of presidential power, depending on whether the 
president has the backing of Congress, whether Congress has been silent, or 
whether Congress has spoken out against the president having the power to 
take a particular action.189  If the latter, than the president will only have 
those powers that are designated solely to him under the U.S. Constitution, 
and not any of the powers that are shared with, or designated to, the 
legislative branch.190  In terms of presidential power, Justice Jackson 
indicated that when the president is acting in concert with Congress, such as 
when Congress has enacted a statute authorizing the president to take an 
action, and the president takes an action under that statute, then the 
president has all of the powers that can be delegated to him by Congress.191  
Therefore, the president has the weight of all of the legislative powers 
behind him, in addition to all of the president’s own independent powers 
under Article II of the U.S. Constitution.  That is when the president’s 
powers are at their strongest.  If Congress has not spoken—if Congress has 
been silent on the issue—then the president has all of the powers designated 
to the executive, as well as any powers that are not expressly denied to the 
president by the U.S. Constitution or by Congress.  Under the third 
category, if Congress has expressly denied the president certain powers to 
 
184.  Fletcher, supra note 180, at 267-68. 
185.  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 588-89. 
186.  Timothy D. A. O’Hara, Without Justification: Misplaced Reliance on United Nations 
Security Council Resolutions for Presidential War Making, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 583, 605 
(1998) (“The Court held that neither the President’s power as Commander-in-Chief nor as Chief 
Executive could sustain the order to seize the mills.”). 
187.  Fletcher, supra note 180, at 268 (explaining that “Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion 
in Steel Seizure has become the leading authority”). 
188.  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 637-38 (Jackson, J., concurring); 
Neighbors, supra note 9, at 115. 
189.  James Park Taylor, Singularity: We Have Met the Enemy and He Is Us: A Legal Guide 
to U.S. Citizens as ‘Enemy Combatants’, 29-APR MONT. LAW. 8, 27 (2004). 
190.  Neighbors, supra note 9, at 115. 
191.  Id. 
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take an action, and yet the president takes that action anyway, then the 
president’s action will be upheld only if that power has been explicitly 
delegated solely to the president, and not to Congress.192  In the Steel 
Seizure Case, Congress had considered granting the power to the president 
that would have allowed him to take this action through an amendment, but 
had decided against granting that power.193  The Supreme Court considered 
that action to be a signal that Congress did not want to grant this authority 
to the president, and therefore, the president’s powers were at their lowest 
ebb.  Because Congress also had the authority under the Commerce Clause 
to regulate steel mills, its decision not to accept the amendment effectively 
denied the president this power.  Therefore, his executive order seizing the 
steel mills was struck down by the Supreme Court as unconstitutional. 
Under Dames & Moore v. Regan, the Supreme Court examined the 
intersection of presidential and congressional actions along a continuum, 
rather than in the three, clear-cut categories that Justice Jackson had 
delineated in the Steel Seizure Case.194  Congress does not always explicitly 
grant the president the authority to take a specific action, nor does it always 
explicitly deny the president particular authority to take a specific action.  
The Steel Seizure Case was actually one of those cases in the gray area 
along the continuum.  Congress did not pass a law refusing to grant this 
authority to the president.  It simply considered adopting into a bill an 
amendment that would have granted the president this authority, but 
decided against it.195  The Supreme Court determined that by not adopting 
the amendment, Congress intended not to grant the president this authority.  
However, attempting to determine congressional intent is not always easy, 
especially when making a leap in logic that congressional refusal to adopt 
 
192.  Taylor, supra note 189, at 27 (“The third category is for cases in which the president 
acts contrary to the express will of Congress.  In this category the president’s actions will be 
sustained only if Congress was without authority to legislate on the subject.”). 
193.  Neighbors, supra note 9, at 115. 
194.  John Cary Sims, Ten Questions: Responses of John Cary Sims, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REV. 1593, 1595 (2007) (“Dames & Moore v. Regan affirms the vitality of Justice Jackson’s 
approach, while suggesting that it is more of a continuum than a set of three firm categories.”). 
195.  Patricia L. Bellia, Executive Power in Youngstown’s Shadows, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 
87, 140 (2002) (“Justice Frankfurter focused in part on the fact that, in considering the Taft-
Hartley Act, the House had rejected an amendment that would have granted the President seizure 
authority.  In addition, one of the Senate sponsors of the legislation specifically noted that the 
Senate Labor Committee had considered and rejected including a seizure provision.  The other 
concurring Justices embraced Justice Frankfurter’s conclusion.  In other words, Congress’s 
consideration and rejection of a particular tool for dealing with industrial strife precluded the 
President’s reliance on it.  Even if Congress had not occupied the field by providing alternative 
procedures, legislative history indicating a specific rejection of the seizure authority signaled 
Congress’s opposition to that course of action. Inferences from the legislative landscape thus 
influenced the Court’s determination that the President acted in opposition to Congress’s will.”) 
(citation omitted). 
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an amendment means that Congress specifically intended to deny the 
president that authority.  If Congress had intended to deny the president the 
authority to take a particular action, why did it not do so explicitly, by 
passing a law forbidding such an action?  Using legislative inaction to 
interpret congressional intent may not always be accurate.  Nevertheless, 
this method of statutory interpretation is frequently utilized by the courts, as 
exemplified in the Steel Seizure Case. 
The Supreme Court will only rarely decide that a president’s executive 
order is unconstitutional.196  The Supreme Court and the lower federal 
courts have generally been quite deferential when the president takes action, 
particularly under executive orders, such as occurred during President 
Roosevelt’s time in office.197  It will be interesting to see how the courts 
handle these issues in the future. 
G. RECENT USE OF EXECUTIVE ORDERS 
These questions have fostered an ongoing constitutional debate that is 
relevant today, as well, concerning executive orders and other issues 
surrounding President Barak Obama, in addition to other recent presidents 
who have made extensive use of presidential powers.  A historical 
examination of Roosevelt’s approach to governmental powers offers insight 
into what is sometimes referred to in more recent times as the 
aggrandizement of presidential power, or the development of the “imperial 
presidency.”198 
 
196.  Branum, supra note 15, at 37 (“Only three Presidents have had executive orders 
overturned in their entirety by the courts.”); id. at 59 (“From the inception of our republic through 
1999, only 253 presidential directives had been modified or revoked, either by Congress or by the 
courts.  A Cato Institute study completed late in 1999 found that Congress had modified or 
revoked 239 executive orders, while the courts had struck down only fourteen orders, either in 
whole or in part.  The orders struck down by the courts resulted from eighty-six challenges, and 
only two orders had been wholly overturned.  Since that time, one additional executive order has 
been overturned in its entirety by a lower court.”) (citation omitted); Neighbors, supra note 9, at 
117 (“The courts have shown a marked reluctance to declare acts of the chief executive 
unconstitutional.”). 
197.  ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 8, at 421 (For 
example, in light of Roosevelt’s unprecedented actions concerning the Forest Service, “Suits were 
begun wherever the chance arose.  It is worth recording that, in spite of the novelty and 
complexity of the legal questions it had to face, no court of last resort has ever decided against the 
Forest Service.  This statement includes two unanimous decisions by the Supreme Court of the 
United States (U.S. vs. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, and Light vs. U.S., 220 U.S. 523).”). 
198.  Melissa K. Mathews, Restoring The Imperial Presidency: An Examination of President 
Bush’s New Emergency Powers, 23 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 455, 456 (2002); see also Daryl 
J. Levinson, Foreword: Looking for Power in Public Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 31, 34 (2016) 
(“Many see the President as increasingly ‘imperial,’ helming ‘the most dangerous branch,’ 
unimpeded by the separation of powers, and even posing an existential threat to constitutional 
democracy.”) (citation omitted). 
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For example, an August 2016 New York Times article entitled “Once 
Skeptical of Executive Power, Obama Has Come to Embrace It” notes: 
Blocked for most of his presidency by Congress, Mr. Obama has 
sought to act however he could.  In the process he created the kind 
of government neither he nor the Republicans wanted—one that 
depended on bureaucratic bulldozing rather than legislative 
transparency.  But once Mr. Obama got the taste for it, he pursued 
his executive power without apology, and in ways that will shape 
the presidency for decades to come.199 
President Obama has not hesitated to use executive orders in the face of 
congressional inaction on issues he believes are of vital importance to the 
nation.  In his State of the Union address, Mr. Obama announced: 
“[w]henever I can take steps without legislation to expand opportunity for 
more American families, that’s what I’m going to do.”200  For example, he 
introduced an executive order raising the minimum wage to $10.10 per hour 
for several hundred thousand federal contract workers, and many large 
corporations soon followed suit.201 
Previously, President George W. Bush also evoked claims of an 
“imperial presidency.”202  For example, one article posited that his actions 
“should trouble all Americans who believe in the democratic process and 
the preservation of constitutional limitations on the power of the executive. 
American freedom and democracy cannot coexist with an imperial 
presidency.”203 
In their book The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic, 
Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule argue that “law does little to constrain 
the modern executive . . . whereas politics and public opinion do constrain 
the modern executive . . . .”204  They echo the presidential prerogative 
theory previously discussed.  In particular, Posner and Vermeule explore 
 
199.  Binyamin Applebaum & Michael D. Shear, Once Skeptical of Executive Power, Obama 
Has Come to Embrace It, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/ 
14/us/politics/obama-era-legacy-regulation.html?_r=1; see also ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN 
VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 15 (2010) (Arguing 
that “law does little to constrain the modern executive . . . whereas politics and public opinion do 
constrain the modern executive.”). 
200.  President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 28, 2014), in President 
Barack Obama’s State of the Union Address, THE WHITE HOUSE OF BARACK OBAMA (2014), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/28/president-barack-obamas-
state-union-address (emphasis added). 
201.  Applebaum & Shear, supra note 199. 
202.  The Imperial Presidency, THE NATION (Aug. 29, 2002), https://www.thenation.com/ 
article/imperial-presidency/. 
203.  Id. 
204.  POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 199, at 15. 
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presidential actions in response to emergencies such as 9/11 and the 2008 
economic crisis.205  Perhaps shockingly, they surmise that the president is 
not bound by law—whether by statutes or constitutional confines, but 
instead they are, as a practical matter, only bound by public opinion and 
politics.206  During a president’s first term in office, he is only bound by his 
desire to be re-elected, and during his second term, by his desire to assure 
his place in history.  The argument should not necessarily go that far, 
because Congress still controls the purse strings that provide funding for all 
executive branch programs.  Therefore, legislation enacted by Congress can 
still tie the hands of the executive branch—including the president—and 
affect the lives of millions.  Although the president retains veto power, he 
or she cannot force their will on every issue, and those compromises have 
real effects constraining the actions of the executive branch. 
Yet, the balance of power regarding policy initiatives has shifted 
significantly toward the president and the executive branch.  This 
examination of President Roosevelt’s deliberate aggrandizement of 
presidential power suggests that this shift occurred over one century ago.  
An August 2013 New York Times article discusses how “executive power 
has expanded steadily under both Republican and Democratic presidents in 
recent decades.”207  Again, this Article demonstrates that the expansion of 
executive power has not only occurred in recent decades, but has been a 
part of the American constitutional system for over one hundred years, 
originating in significant measure with President Roosevelt and his legacy. 
III.  ROOSEVELT’S ATTEMPTS TO REIN IN THE JUDICIAL 
BRANCH 
In contrast to Roosevelt’s success in expanding the use of the executive 
order to rebalance power between the executive and legislative branches, he 
was less successful in his attempts to limit the powers of the judicial 
branch.208  This section will examine his changing perspectives on the 
appropriateness of an independent judiciary.209 
Judicial recall is a process by which, when the populace is displeased 
with a particular judge, it can take measures to hold a recall election, 
 
205.  See generally id. 
206.  Id. 
207.  Applebaum & Shear, supra note 199 (emphasis added). 
208.  G. Alan Tarr, Do Retention Elections Work, 74 MO. L. REV. 605, 606-07 (2009) 
(“Although none of these proposals was adopted nationally, they did enjoy some success in the 
states.  During the early twentieth century, seven states provided for the recall of judges.”). 
209.  Professor Kermit Roosevelt, III, also highlighted Theodore Roosevelt’s approach to 
these issues during his fascinating keynote lecture at the symposium. 
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meaning it can vote the judge out of office.210  This could either be a vote of 
the general public or it could be a vote by the legislature to remove the 
judge from office, depending on the process that has been established in a 
given state.211  Although, initially, a regular judicial election and a judicial 
recall vote may appear similar, the differences between the two are 
significant.  Judicial elections are regularly scheduled, the judge knows 
when he or she will be up for election again, the terms are generally quite 
long, and an incumbent judge may be challenged by a specific individual 
who is vying for that position.212  For example, in the North Dakota 
Supreme Court, each justice is elected once every ten years.213  Judicial 
elections arise only periodically, so the judge is not constantly looking over 
his or her shoulder in fear after making an unpopular decision.  Elections 
enable the electorate to consider the aggregate of the judge’s opinions, 
rather than casting their ballots immediately in the aftermath of a highly 
controversial decision.  However, with judicial recall, if judges make a 
contentious opinion, then shortly thereafter, that judge can be voted out of 
office.  Knowing this, judges may be more reluctant to rule according to the 
law if they know their ruling may be unpopular, and may feel impelled to 
rule according to popular sentiments, even if they feel that decision is not 
the right one. 
Judicial recall should also be distinguished from impeachment, which 
entails a more difficult process to remove a judge for specific misconduct (a 
higher threshold than a simple majority vote as required during recall 
campaigns).214  Impeachment is another way in which members of the 
 
210.  Charles Gardner Geyh, The Dimensions of Judicial Impartiality, 65 FLA. L. REV. 493, 
532 (2013) (Removal of judges can be effected through “the legislative address, which authorizes 
the legislature to seek the removal of a judge by petitioning the governor; automatic removal of a 
judge upon conviction of specified crimes, which gives the executive branch a role to play in 
judicial removal through criminal prosecution; and judicial recall, in which the electorate is 
enabled to seek the removal of a judge in special elections.”) (emphasis added). 
211.  Id. 
212.  See, e.g., the provision for judicial elections in the North Dakota Constitution at N.D. 
CONST. art. VI, § 7. 
213.  N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 7. 
214.  See, e.g., N.D. CONST. art. XI, §§ 8-10: 
Section 8.  The house of representatives shall have the sole power of impeachment.  
The concurrence of a majority of all members elected shall be necessary to an 
impeachment. 
Section 9.  All impeachments shall be tried by the senate.  When sitting for that 
purpose the senators shall be upon oath or affirmation to do justice according to the 
law and evidence.  No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds 
of the members elected.  When the governor or lieutenant governor is on trial, the 
presiding judge of the supreme court shall preside. 
Section 10.  The governor and other state and judicial officers, except county judges, 
justices of the peace and police magistrates, shall be liable to impeachment for 
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judiciary, or of the executive or legislative branches, can be removed from 
office.  However, impeachment has several important distinctions from 
judicial recall.  For example, at the federal level, the power to impeach lies 
with the House of Representatives,215 and the power to try an official who 
has been impeached lies with the Senate.216  Therefore, checks and balances 
are built into the impeachment process, so federal judges are protected 
against the whims of members of Congress who may not like a judge’s 
unpopular decision.  Moreover, the impeachment process normally requires 
higher standards regarding the actions for which a judge can be impeached, 
not merely an unpopular decision,217 and includes significant procedural 
safeguards such as supermajority requirements.218  However, if a procedure 
for recall exists within a particular state, that procedure is constantly 
hanging over the judge’s head as a constant reminder that if he or she makes 
an unpopular decision, there is a distinct possibility that the judge could be 
removed from office. 
Under judicial review, judges determine whether a statute is 
constitutional, examining it to decide if the legislature had the authority to 
enact it and whether its provisions contravene the U.S. Constitution.  The 
power of judicial review, meaning the court’s authority to review a statute 
to determine whether it complies with the U.S. Constitution, was not 
explicitly granted to the federal judiciary or the Supreme Court under the 
text of the U.S. Constitution.219  The U.S. Constitution does not expressly 
give federal judges the power to review the constitutionality of statutes 
passed by Congress and signed by the President.  Instead, the power of 
judicial review was established by one of the first cases decided by the 
Supreme Court, Marbury v. Madison, in 1803, shortly after the founding of 
our country.220  In Marbury, the Court determined that a provision in a 
statute conflicted with a provision in the U.S. Constitution.  In weighing 
which law to follow—the statute or the Constitution—Chief Justice John 
Marshall expounded: 
 
habitual drunkenness, crimes, corrupt conduct, or malfeasance or misdemeanor in 
office, but judgment in such cases shall not extend further than removal from office 
and disqualification to hold any office of trust or profit under the state.  The person 
accused, whether convicted or acquitted, shall nevertheless be liable to indictment, 
trial, judgment and punishment according to law. 
215.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5. 
216.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. 
217.  E.g., at the federal level, removal by impeachment is only for “treason, bribery, or other 
high crimes and misdemeanors.”  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. 
218.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (“[N]o person shall be convicted without the concurrence 
of two thirds of the members present.”). 
219.  Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177. 
220.  Id. 
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It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department 
to say what the law is.  Those who apply the rule to particular 
cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.  If two 
laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the 
operation of each. 
So if a law [e.g., a statute] be in opposition to the constitution, if 
both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that 
the court must either decide that case conformably to the law, 
disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, 
disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these 
conflicting rules governs the case.  This is of the very essence of 
judicial duty. 
If then the courts are to regard the constitution; and the 
constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature; the 
constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to 
which they both apply. 
Those then who controvert the principle that the constitution is to 
be considered, in court, as a paramount law, are reduced to the 
necessity of maintaining that courts must close their eyes on the 
constitution, and see only the law [e.g., a statute]. 
This doctrine would subvert the very foundation of all written 
constitutions.221 
In Marbury, Chief Justice Marshall claimed the authority of the federal 
courts to declare a statute unconstitutional when it conflicts with the U.S. 
Constitution.222  Therefore, a law that was passed by the democratically-
elected branches of government could be struck down by a judge who 
considers the law in light of the U.S. Constitution and deems that law to be 
unconstitutional.  If the judge is going to be faithful to that Constitution, 
and yet the statute contradicts the U.S. Constitution, which should the judge 
apply—the statute or the U.S. Constitution?  Should the judge adhere to the 
statute, effectively meaning that the U.S. Constitution is simply an 
amalgamation of words written on a piece of paper and has no real meaning 
 
221.  Id. at 177-78. 
222.  Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177 (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial 
department to say what the law is. . . . Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of 
necessity expound and interpret that rule.  If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must 
decide on the operation of each. . . . If, then, the courts are to regard the constitution, and the 
constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the constitution, and not such 
ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply . . . a law repugnant to the constitution 
is void; and . . . [the] courts . . . are bound by that instrument.”). 
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or effect, and that neither the judges nor the other branches of government 
have to follow it?  Or, if there is a conflict between the statute and the U.S. 
Constitution, should the judge apply the U.S. Constitution, meaning that he 
or she must strike down the conflicting statute as unconstitutional.  When 
Chief Justice Marshall wrote the Marbury opinion, he determined that when 
the Court considers a statute that has been enacted by Congress, and 
compares it with the U.S. Constitution, it is the U.S. Constitution that is the 
highest law of the land—not the statute.223  Therefore, the Court may 
determine that a statute passed by the state legislature or by Congress is 
unconstitutional—in other words, that the legislative branch does not have 
the authority under the U.S. Constitution to enact such a statute, or that the 
statute conflicts with a provision in the U.S. Constitution. 
Similarly, state courts have the power to determine whether state laws 
are consistent with or conflict with their state constitutions.224  Sometimes 
their power is written expressly in the state constitutions.  For example, 
North Dakota’s constitution allows the North Dakota Supreme Court to 
strike down legislation as unconstitutional, but it requires a supermajority of 
votes to do so (or four of the five justices, instead of three of the five 
justices to decide a regular case).225 
The idea is that judges are wise jurists who respect the U.S. 
Constitution—both the U.S. Constitution at the national level and the state 
constitutions that structure each state’s governmental system.  Judges are 
supposed to protect the country against extraconstitutional behavior by the 
other branches of government and by the federal and state governments vis-
à-vis each other. 
President Roosevelt was not initially in favor of curtailing the 
independence of the judiciary.226  In fact, at the outset of his presidency, 
 
223.  Id. 
224.  See generally Robert F. Utter, State Constitutional Law, the United States Supreme 
Court, and Democratic Accountability: Is There a Crocodile in the Bathtub?, 64 WASH. L. REV. 
19 (1989) (discussing the power of judicial review by state courts). 
225.  Paul D. Carrington, Judicial Independence and Democratic Accountability in Highest 
State Courts, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 95 (1998); see also N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 4 (“A 
majority of the supreme court shall be necessary to constitute a quorum or to pronounce a 
decision, provided that the supreme court shall not declare a legislative enactment unconstitutional 
unless at least four of the members of the court so decide.”); Tarr, supra note 208, at 607 
(“[T]hree states—Nebraska, North Dakota, and Ohio—amended their constitutions to require 
super-majority votes of their supreme courts to invalidate statutes.”). 
226.  ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 8, at 83 (“I 
had been brought up to hold the courts in especial reverence.  The people with whom I was most 
intimate were apt to praise the courts . . . and to speak of them as bulwarks against disorder and 
barriers against demagogic legislation.  These were the same people with whom the judges who 
rendered these decisions were apt to foregather at social clubs, or dinners, or in private life.  Very 
naturally they all tended to look at things from the same standpoint.  Of course it took more than 
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Roosevelt had opposed initiatives such as establishing judicial recall and 
abolishing judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation.227  He was 
not unfamiliar with the potential for corruption among the judicial branch, 
but chose to fight against it using traditional methods.  For example, as the 
youngest member of the New York state legislature, he railed against the 
“ . . . unblushing corruption involving . . . a Judge of the Supreme Court.”228  
Believing that “ . . . an unsullied judiciary was the ground fabric of 
society[,]”229 Roosevelt called for removal of the judge through the 
impeachment process.230  His efforts, however, were unsuccessful due to 
the judge’s associations with “the notorious Jay Gould,”231 one of the most 
powerful men in the United States.232 
But when courts started striking down reformist laws—for example, 
minimum wage laws, labor laws, and other progressive laws233—Roosevelt 
switched his view and began to espouse judicial recall and curtailing the 
power of judicial review.234  During the Progressive Era, concern rose to 
preeminence over the rise of large corporations wielding inordinate power 
over ordinary people, as well as over political parties and the government 
 
one experience such as this Tenement Cigar Case to shake me out of the attitude in which I was 
brought up.”). 
227.  See Carrington, supra note 225, at 94; William Forbath, Popular Constitutionalism in 
the Twentieth Century: Reflections on the Dark Side, the Progressive Constitutional Imagination, 
and the Enduring Role of Judicial Finality in Popular Understandings of Popular Self-Rule, 81 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 967, 979 (2006) (“The idea of popular ‘recall’ of judicial decisions . . . was a 
moderate alternative to judicial recall, which Roosevelt largely abjured, and to abolishing judicial 
review, which he also opposed.”) (citation omitted). 
228.  JACOB A. RIIS, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: THE CITIZEN, 52-53 (The MacMillan 
Company, 1918). 
229.  Id. at 54. 
230.  Id. at 54-55 (quoting “an unnamed writer in the ‘Saturday Evening Post,’ . . . ‘It was on 
April 6, 1882, that young Roosevelt took the floor in the Assembly and demanded that Judge 
Westbrook, of Newburg, be impeached.’”). 
231.  DAVID MCCULLOUGH, MORNINGS ON HORSEBACK, 260 (Simon and Schuster, 1981). 
232.  Id. at 260-66.  For another account of this incident, see MORRIS, THEODORE REX, 
supra note 35, at 175-81. 
233.  RIIS, supra note 228, at 60-61 (After hearing “[t]he bitter cry of the virtually enslaved 
tenement cigarmakers . . . Roosevelt went to their rescue at once.  He . . . went through the 
tenements and saw for himself.  The conditions he found made a profound impression upon 
him. . . . He told the Legislature what he had seen, and a bill was passed to stop the evil, but it was 
declared unconstitutional in the courts.”). 
234.  Talmage Boston, Feature: In the Arena: Theodore Roosevelt and the Law, 74 TEX. B.J. 
508, 514 (2011) (“Like most presidents, Roosevelt wanted federal courts to rule and the 
Constitution to be interpreted one way—his way.  Unlike most presidents, when judges saw issues 
differently than he did, Roosevelt believed they were purposefully betraying his trust.  Small 
wonder that after leaving the White House, as judgments and appellate opinions were rendered by 
various courts against his desires, Roosevelt attempted to persuade the American electorate to vote 
for the repeal of those errant decisions and for the immediate removal from the bench of the 
judges who had authored them.  Fortunately, Americans rejected Roosevelt’s pitch for personal 
power over the rule of law.”). 
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itself.235  Progressives, such as Roosevelt, called upon the legislative branch 
to resolve social problems, including those caused by the rise of large 
unregulated corporations, only to see the successful law reform efforts 
thwarted by courts willing to strike down such legislation as 
unconstitutional.236  For example, the New York Court of Appeals struck 
down a law Roosevelt had championed that would have alleviated the 
horrific conditions under which the “virtually enslaved”237 workers in New 
York tenements labored.238  In his autobiography, Roosevelt noted that 
“[t]his decision completely blocked tenement-house reform legislation in 
New York for a score of years. . . . It was one of the most serious setbacks 
which the cause of industrial and social progress and reform ever 
received.”239 
The progressives questioned the courts’ ability to invalidate legislation 
that was duly enacted by the legislative branch and signed into law by the 
executive branch.240  More specifically, they questioned the ability of the 
courts to wield constitutional provisions, whether in federal or state courts, 
to strike down statutes that the public wanted—and that their duly elected 
representatives had enacted—that would have promoted justice and fairness 
for average citizens.241  Are not each of the three branches of government 
supposed to be co-equal branches of government, so that no one branch was 
more powerful than any of the others?  How then, could the courts—often 
considered to be the least democratic branch of government, because they 
 
235.  Forbath, Popular Constitutionalism in the Twentieth Century, supra note 227, at 975 
(“How could ‘We the People’ rule in the face of the rise of the large-scale corporation and the 
asymmetries of wealth, power, and organization it produced? How could it contend with corporate 
domination of the nation’s political parties and legislatures?”). 
236.  Peter Fish, William Howard Taft and Charles Evans Hughes: Conservative Politicians 
as Chief Judicial Reformers, 1975 SUPREME CT. REV. 123, 125 (1975) (“Theodore Roosevelt . . . 
numbered among the conservative reformers’ chief antagonists.  Such social progressives looked 
to government to ameliorate defects in the fabric of society.  But often they looked in vain as 
courts, particularly federal courts, struck down or otherwise emasculated legislative efforts to 
meet new industrial conditions.  To progressives the ‘activist’ superlegislative role of judges in 
construing constitutions and statutes in a manner according extensive protection to corporate 
property ranked as their fundamental objection to the judiciary.”). 
237.  RIIS, supra note 228, at 60. 
238.  ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 8, at 82. 
239.  Id. at 83. 
240.  THEODORE ROOSEVELT CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 114, at 508. 
241.  ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 8, at 83 
(“[V]arious decisions, not only of the New York court but of certain other State courts and even of 
the United States Supreme Court, during the quarter of a century following the passage of this 
tenement-house legislation, did at last thoroughly wake me. . . . I grew to realize that all that . . . 
could be said with equal truth and justice about the numerous decisions which in our own day 
were erected as bars across the path of social reform, and which brought to naught so much of the 
effort to secure justice and fair dealing for workingmen and workingwomen, and for plain citizens 
generally.”). 
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are supposed to be insulated from political pressures—tell the other 
branches of government what they can and cannot do?  This, the 
progressive reformers believed, was a particularly irksome problem—and 
particularly the courts’ faulty interpretation and application of the U.S. 
Constitution, according to the reformers’ beliefs.242  The progressives were 
angry with the courts for exerting the power of judicial review to invalidate 
the actions of the legislative and executive branches that would have 
ameliorated the conditions of the poor as against the rich who exploited 
them.243 
Roosevelt felt that the courts were purportedly handing down 
principled decisions by wielding the power of judicial review to strike down 
progressive legislation as unconstitutional, but that they were actually 
engaged in making policy decisions.244  He felt that these were activist 
judges furtively inventing constitutional interpretations that they could use 
to prevent progressive legislation throughout states with reform-minded 
legislatures.245  Roosevelt felt this situation was intolerable—that people 
who fundamentally want to prevent change are using this constitutional 
doctrine as a way to defeat progressive legislation.246  These judges could 
not be removed by the process of impeachment, so he lead the fight to 
implement measures to override the judges, such as judicial recall, so the 
 
242.  Id. at 478-79 (Roosevelt indicated, “[n]ot only some of the Federal judges, but some of 
the State courts invoked the Constitution in a spirit of the narrowest legalistic obstruction to 
prevent the Government from acting in defense of labor on inter-State railways.”). 
243.  Id. at 473 (“The judge who by word or deed makes it plain that the corrupt corporation, 
the law-defying corporation, the law-defying rich man, has in him a sure and trustworthy ally, the 
judge who by misuse of the process of injunction makes it plain that in him the wage-worker has a 
determined and unscrupulous enemy, the judge who when he decides in an employers’ liability or 
a tenement house factory case shows that he has neither sympathy for nor understanding of those 
fellow-citizens of his who most need his sympathy and understanding; these judges work as much 
evil as if they pandered to the mob, as if they shrank from sternly repressing violence and 
disorder.”). 
244.  Id. at 82 (“[T]he courts were not necessarily the best judges of what should be done to 
better social and industrial conditions.”). 
245.  Id. at 438 (“The courts, not unnaturally, but most regrettably, and to the grave 
detriment of the people and of their own standing, had for a quarter of a century been on the whole 
the agents of reaction, and by conflicting decisions which, however, in their sum were hostile to 
the interests of the people, had left both the nation and the several States well-nigh impotent to 
deal with the great business combinations.”). 
246.  Id. (“Sometimes [the courts] forbade the Nation to interfere, because such interference 
trespassed on the rights of the States; sometimes they forbade the States to interfere (and often 
they were wise in this), because to do so would trespass on the rights of the Nation; but always, or 
well-nigh always, their action was negative action against the interests of the people, ingeniously 
devised to limit their power against wrong, instead of affirmative action giving to the people the 
power to right wrong.”). 
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worst of these obstructionists could be neutralized and no longer impede the 
progressive agenda.247 
Therefore, during his presidency, Roosevelt began expressing 
frustration with the courts and advocating the need to curtail their power.248  
After 1910, Roosevelt began to speak about judicial recall, because he 
believed that the courts were frustrating his progressive political 
program.249  Roosevelt felt that some of the men who served as judges at 
the turn of the century were habitually staunch conservatives—reactionaries 
who could not be trusted—and were holding back the progressive 
movement in this country.250  Therefore, he sought to establish mechanisms 
to avoid letting these perceived intransigents deny the will of the people for 
progressive reforms.251 
Roosevelt particularly advocated for state constitutional reform to 
allow for the procedures of popular override of judicial decisions.252  This 
type of judicial referendum describes a procedure undertaken when the 
populace is displeased with a particular judicial decision, so that decision is 
put to a vote and the general population can overturn that decision.253 
 
247.  THEODORE ROOSEVELT CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 114, at 507-11. 
248.  Edward Hartnett, Why is the Supreme Court of the United States Protecting State 
Judges from Popular Democracy?, 75 TEX. L. REV. 907, 934 (1997) (“As president, Roosevelt 
‘had been critical of the judiciary for blocking social legislation and was convinced that no 
comprehensive program of reform could be achieved unless the courts could be curbed.’”) 
(citation omitted). 
249.  Id. at 935 (“Roosevelt proposed a way to reverse such cases: recall of judicial 
decisions, an idea that took shape during 1911.  In the summer of that year, when the admission of 
Arizona to the Union was under consideration, Roosevelt criticized President Taft for opposing 
the provision in the Arizona Constitution for recall of judges.”) (citation omitted). 
250.  THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 9, at 438 (“[The courts] had 
rendered these decisions sometimes as upholders of property rights against human rights, being 
especially zealous in securing the rights of the very men who were most competent to take care of 
themselves; and sometimes in the name of liberty, in the name of the so-called ‘new freedom,’ in 
reality the old, old ‘freedom,’ which secured to the powerful the freedom to prey on the poor and 
the helpless.”). 
251.  THEODORE ROOSEVELT CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 114, at 507-11. 
252.  Hartnett, supra note 248, at 935 (“In November of 1911, after Judge Learned Hand had 
expressed concern that Roosevelt’s writing would be construed as a dangerous invitation to exert 
popular pressure on judges, Roosevelt wrote to Hand: ‘Evidently I must try to make my 
expression more clear.  I absolutely agree with you as to bringing pressure to bear on the judges, 
but in Constitutional cases the alternative must be to have the right of appeal from the judges.  
Take the New York cases to which I refer.  My idea would be to have the Constitutional 
Convention provide that the people shall have the right to vote as to whether or not the judges’ 
interpretation of the law in such a case is correct, and that their vote shall be decisive.’”) (citation 
omitted). 
253.  The term “judicial referendum” can also refer to a process by which voters cast and up 
or down vote on judicial incumbents in a regularly scheduled election, as opposed to holding 
contested elections.  See Blair T. O’Connor, Note, Want to Limit Congressional Terms? Vote for 
“None of the Above”, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 361, 402-03 (1997). 
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Roosevelt also considered the possibility of abolishing the practice of 
judicial review in state courts, thereby not allowing state judges or justices 
to declare a law unconstitutional if it was popularly voted upon and 
approved by the branches of government that were elected by the people.254  
The progressive reformers perceived that the problem with the courts was 
that judges were hostile to legislative efforts to ameliorate the concerns of 
laborers and the working poor who were being exploited by the new, 
wealthy, and powerful corporate interests.255  State courts continued to 
strike down progressive legislation using the state and federal constitutions 
as a sword.256 
In response, movements across the country arose to attempt to curb the 
power of judges.  Part of these efforts were to put into place mechanisms 
allowing for judicial recall.  Considering these mechanisms, Roosevelt 
emphatically stated: 
Massachusetts has the right to have appointive judges who serve 
during good behavior, subject to removal, not by impeachment, 
but by simple majority vote of the two houses of the Legislature 
whenever the representatives of the people feel that the needs of 
the people require such removal. . . . I prefer the Massachusetts 
[approach].257 
Some states adopted constitutional provisions allowing for recall of 
judges and other elected officials.258  Other states attempted to limit judicial 
power by instituting referenda over judicial decisions.259  This was a call for 
popular democracy over the independence of the judicial branch.260  Of 
course, this was part of the overall Progressive Party’s push toward the 
direct primary, the initiative, referendum, and recall, as well as a 
constitutional amendment to make it easier to amend the U.S. 
 
254.  THEODORE ROOSEVELT CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 114, at 282. 
255.  Fish, supra note 236, at 125. 
256.  Hartnett, supra note 248, at 935-36 (“Again and again in the past justice has been 
scandalously obstructed by State courts declaring State laws in conflict with the Federal 
Constitution, although the Supreme Court of the nation had never so decided or had even decided 
in a contrary sense.”). 
257.  Theodore Roosevelt, A Charter of Democracy, Address Before the Ohio Constitutional 
Convention (Feb. 21, 1912), http://www.theodore-roosevelt.com/images/research/txtspeeches/ 
704.pdf. 
258.  Carrington, supra note 225, at 94 (“Seven states adopted constitutional provisions for 
the recall of elected officers, including judges, a proposal horrifying to political conservatives 
professing to cherish the independence of the judiciary from political intimidation.”) (citation 
omitted). 
259.   Id. at 94 (“Colorado took a different step, providing in its constitution for review by 
referendum of judicial decisions.”). 
260.  Fish, supra note 236, at 125. 
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Constitution.261  The 1912 Progressive Party Platform called for “such 
restriction of the power of the courts as shall leave to the people the 
ultimate authority to determine fundamental questions of social welfare and 
public policy.”262  In 1912, Roosevelt espoused that “the judge is just as 
much the servant of the people as any other official.”263  He advocated that 
the people should have the final decision-making authority as to 
constitutional matters, and therefore, should have the ability to overturn 
judicial decisions on constitutional cases by popular referendum.264 
As a result of being outraged by the decision of New York’s highest 
court to abrogate the state’s mandatory worker’s compensation statute, 
Roosevelt supported an amendment to the New York constitution that 
would allow for the people to overturn by referendum judicial decisions on 
the constitutionality of legislation.265  The court had held that the worker’s 
compensation statute, which provided that employers would be liable for 
injuries to employees on the job, was unconstitutional under both the 
federal and state constitutions.266  Roosevelt responded: “It is out of the 
question . . . that the courts should be permitted permanently to shackle our 
hands as they would shackle them by decisions such as this.”267 
However, even Roosevelt’s supporters questioned the wisdom of his 
approach out of concern that the use of popular referenda in determining the 
 
261.  Forbath, Popular Constitutionalism in the Twentieth Century, supra note 227, at 977-
78. 
262.  Fish, supra note 236, at 125 (citing The Progressive Party Platform of 1912, in THE 
PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT: 1900-1915, 129-30 (Hofstadter, ed., 1965)). 
263.  Id. at 126 (quoting HENRY F. PRINGLE, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: A BIOGRAPHY 558 
(1931)). 
264.  Forbath, Popular Constitutionalism in the Twentieth Century, supra note 227, at 979 
(“[H]igh court decisions ought to be subject to review by the people through referendum.  ‘If any 
considerable number of the people feel’ that a constitutional decision ‘is in defiance of justice’ or 
misjudges the proper bounds of the state’s police power, ‘they should be given the right by 
petition to bring that decision before the voters’; a progressive state constitution must ‘permit the 
people themselves by popular vote, after due deliberation and discussion, but finally and without 
appeal, to settle what the proper construction of any Constitutional point is.’”) (citing Roosevelt, A 
Charter of Democracy, supra note 257); see also THEODORE ROOSEVELT CYCLOPEDIA, supra 
note 114, at 119 (“[T]here is no justification for refusing to give the people the real, and not 
merely the nominal, ultimate decision on questions of constitutional law.”). 
265.  Carrington, supra note 225, at 94-95 (“He proposed for New York the Colorado 
provision allowing a right of appeal to the people through a referendum on the constitutionality of 
legislation.”). 
266.  Id. (“Disregarding social and economic data depicting the oppression of labor, the court 
held that employers were guaranteed the right by both federal and state constitutions to employ 
workers without taking responsibility for their work-related injuries.”). 
267.  Id. at 95 (citing Workmen’s Compensation, 98 THE OUTLOOK 49 (May 13, 1911); see 
also Theodore Roosevelt, Introduction, in WILLIAM L. RANSOM, MAJORITY RULE AND THE 
JUDICIARY: AN EXAMINATION OF CURRENT PROPOSALS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
AFFECTING THE RELATIONS OF COURTS TO LEGISLATION, 3-24 (1912). 
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constitutionality of statutes may not be advisable.268  For example, his close 
friend, Henry Cabot Lodge, strongly opposed Roosevelt’s position, which 
irreparably tarnished their longstanding friendship.269  This is another area 
where a stark contrast can be seen between President Taft and President 
Roosevelt.  This stance diminished Roosevelt’s chances in the 1912 
presidential election.270  Roosevelt’s detractors, such as William Howard 
Taft, Henry Cabot Lodge, Elihu Root, and others, were worried that he was 
attempting to undermine the rule of law.271  The American public had not 
fully embraced popular constitutionalism and has been wary of popular 
control over the judiciary or judicial decision-making.272  Therefore, even 
many who supported the progressive platform feared having the general 
population be able to overrule a decision of the courts and impose their own 
interpretation of the constitution.273  The founding fathers created the U.S. 
Constitution and framework of government via the three coequal branches 
of government—they intentionally fractured the government.274  They did 
not want to reinstitute the tyranny they had experienced under King George, 
 
268.  Carrington, supra note 225, at 94 (“Even Learned Hand, though a devoted follower of 
Roosevelt, thought ill of this idea as a perversion of the judicial role in constitutional 
adjudication.”). 
269.  Forbath, Popular Constitutionalism in the Twentieth Century, supra note 227, at 980 
(“Even Henry Cabot Lodge, who owed Roosevelt his reelection to the Senate in 1911, now wrote 
his lifelong friend that he could not support his quest for the White House: ‘I found myself 
confronted with the fact that I was opposed to your policies declared at Columbus [at the Ohio 
Constitutional Convention] with great force in regard to changes in our Constitution and principles 
of government. . . . I knew of course that you and I differed on some of these points but I had not 
realized that the difference was so wide.’”). 
270.  Carrington, supra note 225, at 94; see also Forbath, Popular Constitutionalism in the 
Twentieth Century, supra note 227, at 979 (“[O]f all the innovations in “the machinery of 
government” that Roosevelt championed, the “recall of state judicial decisions” proved most 
controversial.  His bold statement of the people’s interpretive authority hobbled Roosevelt’s 
chance of securing the Republican nomination.”). 
271.  Hartnett, supra note 248, at 937-38. 
272.  Forbath, Popular Constitutionalism in the Twentieth Century, supra note 227, at 968 
(“When matters came to a head, [Americans] embraced only halfway the counsel and vision of 
Progressives like Theodore Roosevelt who looked to undo judicial finality, dethrone the courts, 
and institute a new democratic allocation of interpretive authority. . . . Popular sway over 
constitutional questions in both eras stood in tension with a deeply conservative current of popular 
skepticism about the people’s collective enthusiasms about the uses of state power, a current that 
ran in favor of judicial finality.”). 
273.  Hartnett, supra note 248, at 942 (“The platform, however, did not endorse Roosevelt’s 
recall proposal but instead called for a less radical method of reversing state court decisions 
invalidating state statutes on federal constitutional grounds, which had been proposed by the 
American Bar Association: review of such a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States.  
It appears that not all Progressives shared Roosevelt’s ‘distrust and suspicion of the judiciary.’”) 
(citations omitted). 
274.  Hon. Harold Baer, Jr., & Arminda Bepko, A Necessary and Proper Role for Federal 
Courts in Prison Reform: The Benjamin V. Malcom Consent Decrees, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 3, 
6-7 (2007-2008). 
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so they separated the branches of government and separated the federal and 
state governments as well, providing many checks and balances between all 
of these separate entities.275  The legislature would pass the laws, which the 
president would either sign or veto.276  The judiciary was supposed to be the 
independent branch—to be the neutral arbiter.277  Thus, when parties come 
before a judge, multiple safeguards have been put into place allowing the 
judge to be neutral and not subject to the will of the people in determining 
the case.  Particularly in the federal system, the judges and justices are 
appointed by the president and approved by a majority of the Senate.278  
Once federal judges are in office, they are appointed for life, presuming 
good behavior.279  No Supreme Court justice and very few lower court 
judges have ever been removed through the impeachment process;280 
therefore, Congress cannot realistically use the threat of impeachment to 
sway judges against making unpopular decisions.  Both the perception and 
hopefully the fact of neutrality have been built into the federal judicial 
system, to protect it from being buffeted by political winds or the caprice of 
the populace. 
Roosevelt’s attempt to curtail the independence of the judiciary was 
one of the factors that cost him his friendship with Henry Cabot Lodge and 
Elihu Root, as well as his relationship with William Taft.281  Many of 
Roosevelt’s supporters felt that his position on these issues was particularly 
unwise.282  It lost him a great deal of support in the Progressive Party and in 
 
275.  Eric J. McDonald Guadalupe, Double Jeopardy, Dual Sovereignty, and Other Legal 
Fictions, 28 REV. JURIDICA U. INTER. P.R. 201, 218 (1994) (“A strong central government, like 
foreign alliances, was viewed with suspicion.  The experiences of the founding fathers had forged 
this mind set.  The American revolution was less a war for civil liberties than one fought against a 
distant and strong centralized government.  To many legal scholars of that time, the States, not the 
People, had replaced King George III as the Sovereign.  It was these same Sovereigns that had 
convened in Philadelphia in 1789 to forge a new compact.”). 
276.  U.S. CONST. art. I, §. 7, cl. 2-3. 
277.  See generally Bruce Fein & Burt Neuborne, The Case for Independence: Why Should 
We Care About Independent and Accountable Judges?, 61-APR OR. ST. B. BULL. 9, 10 (2001). 
278.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
279.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
280.  Joel B. Grossman & David A. Yalof, The Day After: Do We Need A “Twenty-Eighth 
Amendment?”, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 7 (2000); KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 31 (19th ed. 2016) (“No Supreme Court Justice has ever been removed 
under that provision”); Gideon Mark, SEC and CFTC Administrative Proceedings, 19 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 45, 100 n.381 (2016) (noting that only “fifteen Article III judges were impeached 
during the period 1803-2010”) (citation omitted). 
281.  Talmage Boston, Review of in the Arena: Theodore Roosevelt and the Law, 74 TEX. B. 
J. 508, 511-12 (2011). 
282.  Hartnett, supra note 248, at 934-43. 
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his campaign in 1912 to seek reelection to the presidency against President 
Taft, and it contributed to his loss during that election.283 
Both judicial recall and judicial referendum are anathema to people 
who are concerned about preserving the independence of the judiciary.  The 
two lawmaking branches of government, the legislature (which passes the 
bills) and the executive (which signs the bills into law and ensures that they 
are carried out) are elected by the people and subject to the will of the 
people.284  These are the political branches of government, meaning that by 
structural design, both are intended to be responsive to popular will and are 
influenced greatly by politics, the political parties, media, polling, and so 
on.  By contrast, the judicial branch of government was intended by the 
framers—at least at the federal level—to be independent and not to be 
influenced by the whims of the populace.285  Judges are supposed to be 
neutral adjudicators who interpret and apply the law in a fair and impartial 
manner, and who are not unduly swayed in their decisions by outside 
forces, such as popular opinion.  Instead, federal judges are nominated by 
the president and appointed to the judiciary with the advice and consent of 
the Senate.286  Although that process is also influenced by politics, it is 
perceived to be less so than elections.287  Moreover, federal judges are 
appointed for life as long as they maintain good behavior,288 which makes a 
tremendous difference in their ability to maintain both the perception and 
 
283.  Id. 
284.  U.S. CONST. art. 1, §§ 1-2; art. 2, § 1. 
285.  David K. Stott, Zero-Sum Judicial Elections: Balancing Free Speech and Impartiality 
Through Recusal Reform, 2009 B.Y.U. L. REV. 481, 484 (2009) (“In the eighteenth century, the 
framers of federal and state constitutions firmly believed in creating a bench sanitized from the 
democratic whims of the people, and early methods of judicial selection emphasized this principle. 
Perhaps because they viewed British judges as mere puppets of the King, the Framers of the 
United States Constitution made judicial independence the bedrock principle of Article III.”) 
(citation omitted). 
286.  U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2, cl. 2. 
287.  Daniel R. Deja, How Judges Are Selected: A Survey of the Judicial Selection Process in 
the United States, 75 MICH. B. J. 904, 904-05 (1996) (“Four primary methods are used to select 
judges in the United States: gubernatorial appointment, gubernatorial appointment with retention 
election, partisan election and nonpartisan election.  Three states select judges by legislative 
appointment or election.  Three states fill unexpired terms by Supreme Court appointment.  The 
gubernatorial appointment without a retention election most closely emulates the federal system of 
judicial selection.  U.S. District Court judges are appointed by the executive (the president), with 
consent of the Senate, for life. . . . The very nature of periodic elections is to give the electorate an 
opportunity to directly either select or reject judges.  Gubernatorial appointment without a 
retention election removes the electorate from directly influencing the judicial selection process. 
Judicial selection becomes a function of elected representatives of the people.”) (citations 
omitted). 
288.  U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 1. 
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the reality of independence.289  Although judges are appointed by presidents 
with a particular political stance, believing that the judges they appoint also 
reflect that stance, once in office, with the guarantees of independence 
brought by lifetime tenure, the judges or justices will sometimes adopt 
positions that starkly diverge from that of the president who appointed 
them.290 
By contrast, judicial recall would subject judges directly to popular 
will.291  Therefore, as previously described, judges would more likely be 
responsive to popular opinion in deciding each case or face the possibility 
of being recalled from office.  Having the possibility of judicial recall 
looming over one’s head is even more onerous than facing periodic judicial 
elections, where people vote on aggregate of decisions, not immediately in 
reaction to one highly unpopular decision that can trigger a recall campaign.  
Judicial referendum would subject the outcome of particular cases to 
popular will, in effect enabling the general population to sit in judgment of 
two parties in a lawsuit.292 
More moderate reformers, such as then-President William Taft, 
emphatically opposed Roosevelt’s position.  This assault on the courts 
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appointment as a means of putting judges on the bench increases independence because judges are 
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winning the next election may enter the decision calculus in cases that catch the public eye.”) 
(citation omitted). 
290.  SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 280, at 30-31 (“It has long been accepted that the 
President may choose nominees who share his ideological views.”); James J. Brudney, Foreseeing 
Greatness: Measurable Performance Criteria and the Selection of Supreme Court Justices, 32 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1015, 1016 (2005) (“Warren Burger and Harry Blackmun . . . were nominated 
for the Supreme Court by the same President, who had made clear that he wanted new members of 
the Court to reflect a certain judicial philosophy.  As Supreme Court Justices, however, Burger 
and Blackmun came to differ sharply in their doctrinal and ideological orientation.”) (citation 
omitted). 
291.  See, e.g., THEODORE ROOSEVELT CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 114, at 106 (“We wish to 
see the people the masters of the court not to overthrow the Constitution but to overthrow those 
who have perverted the Constitution into an antisocial fetich [sic], used to prevent our securing 
laws to protect the ordinary working man and working woman in their rights.”); see also id. at 119 
(quoting Roosevelt’s approval of judicial recall in certain instances). 
292.  See, e.g., THEODORE ROOSEVELT CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 114, at 119 (“The safe way 
to prevent popular discontent with the courts from becoming acute and chronic, is to provide the 
people with the simple, direct, effective, and yet limited power to secure the interpretation of their 
own constitution in accordance with their own deliberate judgment.”). 
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offended Taft, who was a leading advocate for independence of the 
judiciary.293  Taft, who served as president between 1909-1913, revered 
judges and the judiciary.294  In fact, Taft advocated for judicial reform of 
the laws as a more effective and efficient way to achieve needed changes in 
the law than simply relying on legislatures,295 and he zealously worked to 
preserve the independence of the judiciary throughout his tenure as 
President.296  He believed that judges must be insulated from popular 
caprice and political pressure.  Therefore, he supported judicial structures 
favoring independence, such as an appointment process rather than direct 
elections for judges and lifetime tenure during good behavior.297  Taft was 
vehemently opposed to elections for judges, the adoption of provisions for 
judicial recall, the adoption of referendum processes to overturn judicial 
decisions by popular vote, and other so-called reforms that would curb the 
ability of judges to decide cases based upon merit than upon the whims of 
the people.298  Taft was concerned that “law would become dependent ‘on 
the momentary passions of a people,’ expressed via initiative, referenda, 
and recall of judicial officials and decisions.”299  His aim for reforming the 
courts, and the aim of other conservative reformers, was to address the 
concern that the courts were too “slow, costly, and inefficient.”300  His faith 
in the judicial system served him well, as he ultimately became the tenth 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, serving between July 1921 and 
February 1930.301 
 
293.  Hartnett, supra note 248, at 938-39 (“Roosevelt’s position on judges stood in stark 
contrast to that of the incumbent President Taft, who in August of 1911 had vetoed statehood for 
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299.  Id. (citing HENRY F. PRINGLE, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT: A 
BIOGRAPHY 766 (1939)). 
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Moreover, confidence began to wane in the wise deliberation of the 
popular vote that underpinned the movement toward each of the progressive 
governmental reforms—direct democracy through the initiative, recall, 
referendum, direct primaries, and an easier constitutional amendment 
process.302  The rise of mass advertising and propaganda machineries 
during World War I gave rise to the concern that the will of the people 
would be manufactured and manipulated by moneyed interests and eroded 
support for direct democracy movements.303  And of course, Woodrow 
Wilson, who advocated for a more moderate progressivism within the 
current constitutional structure, won the 1912 election, defeating both 
Roosevelt and Taft.304 
Judicial review is still alive and well, because Roosevelt’s attempts to 
curb the court’s ability to uphold the U.S. Constitution against conflicting 
statutes did not prevail.  Given the recurring attacks on the Supreme Court 
and the federal and state judiciaries, with some activists calling for ways to 
bring the courts more in keeping with their own political proclivities, it is 
interesting to examine the parallels with Roosevelt’s time.305 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
President Theodore Roosevelt achieved great accomplishments 
throughout the course of his career in public service, endearing himself to 
many. 306  His massive personality, charisma, and energy enabled him to 
create sweeping changes in the operation and integrity of both state and 
 
302.  Forbath, Popular Constitutionalism in the Twentieth Century, supra note 227, at 982-
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federal governments, particularly impacting the nation’s natural 
resources.307  Although he did not achieve everything he set out to 
accomplish (such as ensconcing popular will over the judiciary), his 
tremendous expansion of presidential power through the use of executive 
orders helped reshape the relationship between Congress and the executive 
branch that has endured to the present day.  His legacy helps to inform the 
current debates about the appropriate role of the executive and legislative 
branches at the federal level. 
 
 
307.  As his presidency came to a close, “for millions of contemporary Americans, he was 
already memorialized in the eighteen national monuments and five national parks he had created 
by executive order, or cajoled out of Congress.  The ‘inventory,’ . . . included protected pinnacles, 
a crater lake, a rain forest and a petrified forest, a wind cave and a jewel cave, cliff dwellings, a 
cinder cone and skyscraper of hardened magma, sequoia stands, glacier meadows, and the 
grandest of all canyons.”  MORRIS, THEODORE REX, supra note 35, at 554. 
